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Abstract
Blackwell approachability, regret minimization and calibration are three criteria
evaluating a strategy (or an algorithm) in different sequential decision problems, or
repeated games between a player and Nature. Although they have at first sight noth-
ing in common, links between have been discovered: both consistent and calibrated
strategies can be constructed by following, in some auxiliary game, an approacha-
bility strategy.
We gathered famous or recent results and provide new ones in order to develop
and generalize Blackwell’s elegant theory. The final goal is to show how it can
be used as a basic powerful tool to exhibit a new class of intuitive algorithms,
based on simple geometric properties. In order to be complete, we also prove that
approachability can be seen as a byproduct of the very existence of consistent or
calibrated strategies.
Introduction
Sequential decision problems can be represented as repeated games between a player
and Nature. At each stage the player (also called agent, decision maker or predictor
depending on the context) chooses an element of his decision set. At the same time,
Nature chooses on her side a state of the world. Those sequences of choices generate a
sequence of outcomes that induces an overall payoff to the player.
The opponent is called Nature as we do not precise her payoff, her objectives or her
rationality; absolutely no assumptions is made on her behavior, and future states of the
world cannot be inferred from the past. Typically the environment is not stochastic or
Bayesian but adversarial; for instance, Nature can represent one malignant opponent,
or a set of independent (or correlated) players. A crucial requirement of these model is
that a strategy of the player must be good (i.e., it must fulfill some exogenous criterion)
against every possible sequence of states of the world (or simply against any strategy of
Nature).
Depending on the structure of outcomes mappings, overall objectives of the player
might vary. Hannan [30] studied the case where an outcome is actually a real payoff.
The player’s goal is to maximize his average (or cumulative) payoff. As we made no
assumption on Nature’s behavior, a player can not ensure to himself a given exogenous
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amount, unlike in traditional zero sum game where a value can be guaranteed: assume
for instance that Nature decides to give a payoff of zero (or one, minus one, etc) to the
player at each stage, no matter what he does.
The criterion Hannan introduced is called regret and measures the difference between
the average payoff the player got and what he would have got if he had chosen the same
action repeatedly. It is somehow related to convex optimization (if Nature chooses
repeatedly the same loss function), or more precisely to online convex optimization.
Main results of Hannan [30] are that such a consistent strategy, i.e., a strategy without
regret exists, and he constructed one. This has been widely refined and improved using
different techniques and ideas by notably (providing an exhaustive list seems almost
impossible as the subject has been developed by many different communities) Foster
& Vohra [23], Hart & Mas-Colell [31], Fudenberg & Levine [28], Lehrer [43], Auer,
Cesa-Bianchi & Gentile [3], Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi [14] (see also references therein),
Sorin [71]...
When outcomes are vectorial (and not scalar) payoffs, the problem is closely related
to multicriteria optimization, each coordinate representing a different sub-objective. In-
stead of considering some exogenous convex combination of these objectives or optimizing
them in a given order (to encompass this framework into the precedent one), Blackwell [9]
introduced another concept. He considered that some target set is given and the player’s
goal is that the average outcome converges to it; on the contrary, Nature tries to push
it away. Formally, a given closed set is approachable, if the player has a strategy such
that the average payoffs remains, after some maybe large stage, arbitrarily closed to this
target set, no matter the sequence of moves of Nature.
Blackwell’s approachability theory is quite elegant as it relies on simple geometric
properties. They allowed him to characterize explicitly approachable convex sets and to
provide a simple sufficient approachability condition for non-convex set (such sets are
called, in reference to Blackwell, B-sets). Spinat [73] proved later that this was in fact
almost a necessary condition.
Maybe the first and most important use of this whole theory is due to Kohlberg [39].
He constructed, using this simple tool, an optimal strategy for the uninformed player in
zero-sum games with incomplete information, introduced by Aumann and Maschler [5]
(see for instance Mertens, Sorin & Zamir [55] and references given for more details on
this subject). Approachability gained also a recent interest, both from the game theory
and machine learning community, with works of – again non-exhaustively – Vieille [77],
Hart & Mas-Colell [32], Spinat [73], Lehrer [42], Benaïm, Hofbauer & Sorin [7], Mannor
& Shimkin [49], Lehrer & Solan [44, 46], As Soulaimani, Quincampoix & Sorin [2],
Mannor & Tsitsiklis [53], Perchet [60, 61], Rakhlin, Sridharan & Tewari [66], Perchet &
Quincampoix [63]...
Another (and the last to be considered here) criterion is calibration, written within
this framework by Dawid [16] and extended thereafter by, in many others, Foster &
Vohra [24], Fudenberg & Levine [27], Lehrer [41], Sandroni, Smorodinsky & Vohra [68],
Sorin [71], Perchet [60], Foster, Rakhlin, Sridharan & Tewari [22], and so on.
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Here, a stage outcome is not some payoff (either scalar or vectorial) but the actual
state of the world chosen by Nature. The overall objective of the player is to predict,
sequentially, the whole sequence of states so that the average prediction and the empirical
distribution of states are asymptotically arbitrarily close. Without any other restrictions,
this is in fact fairly easy: one just has to predict at some stage the outcome of the
precedent one.
Additional requirements can be, for instance, that predictions can only belong to
some finite (yet maybe large) set and that the empirical distribution of states on the
set of stages where a specific prediction is made is closer to this prediction than to any
other possible one. An usual and celebrated example consists in a meteorologist that
predicts, each day, the probability of rain the following day. Predictions belongs to 0%,
10%, 20%, etc. and it is asked that that when a meteorologist says that the probability
of rain is, say, 30%, it rains in average between 35% and 45% of the times.
Oakes [57] and Dawid [17] proved that no deterministic algorithm can be calibrated
(yet this strong assessment could be discussed) while random algorithm can, as proved
by Foster & Vohra [24]. The existence of such algorithms can be seen as a negative result,
as it claims that a strategic non-informed meteorologist can mimic an expert one (that
knows the true underlying process, if it exists); a whole literature studied this aspect
and recent results are gathered into the survey of Olszewski [58]. On the other hand, it
can also be seen as a positive result, as it states that the long term behavior of Nature
can asymptotically be predicted, and this might lead to another class of algorithms and
results, as in Foster & Vohra [23] or Perchet [59, 62].
A common feature of regret minimization and calibration is that they can be written
as a specific case of approachability of a well chosen target set in some auxiliary vectorial
payoff game . The first to notice this property is Blackwell [10] (this idea is already
mentioned at the end of the seminal paper of Hannan [30] or in Luce & Raiffa [48]) and
then by Foster [21], Hart & Mas-Colell [32], Lehrer & Solan [45], Sorin [71], Perchet [60],
Mannor & Stoltz [50], Abernathy, Barltlett & Hazan [1]...
We assumed implicitly that the player observes the sequence of states of the world;
this is in fact a crucial hypothesis here, sometimes referred to as full monitoring. In
particular, we will not consider the case of partial monitoring (or bandit problems), or
stochastic games (where, for instance, the whole sequence of outcomes could depend of
a unique choice at some stage). Those are also interesting subjects, yet far from the
current scope.
Objectives and Structure of the paper.
Describing explicit interactions and equivalences between the notions of approachability,
calibration and regret is the central point of this paper, the final argument being that
that explicit constructions of consistent and calibrated strategies (even for more precise
or refined notions that the ones introduced here) are possible and provided thanks to
approachability theory. The remaining is organized as follows:
In Section 1, we introduce the concept of approachability, centerpiece of this work.
3
We first recall (in Subsection 1.1) a sufficient and necessary condition under which
an arbitrary set is approachable. The specific case of convex sets, for which a complete
characterization is available, is studied in Subsection 1.2. First extensions and gener-
alizations of the framework (e.g., in infinite dimension, with variable stage durations,
unbounded payoffs, etc.) are given in Subsection 1.3. Last Subsection 1.4 is concerned
with other possible proofs and techniques of approachability. In particular, we show that
approachability with respect to the supremum norm can be achieved using some poten-
tial minimization, generalizing the exponential weight algorithm; we also prove that the
usual Euclidian (or Hilbertian) framework is not necessary for approachability.
Proofs are almost always provided, as long as they bring something new to the
literature (yet some technical lemmas are delayed to the Appendix).
Regret minimization is introduced in Section 2. Several refinements are introduced
and links with game theory (as well as famous algorithms called exponential weight
algorithm and follow the perturbed leader) are given in Subsection 2.3. Since our pur-
pose is to provide reduction to some auxiliary approachability problems, proofs are only
sketched in this section and delayed to the last one. An example of regret minimization,
with expert advice is given for illustration at the end; however, this subject is very well
studied in the book of Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi [14].
Calibration and its generalizations are formalized in Section 3; for the same reasons,
proofs are essentially delayed to the last section. We provide there a discussion on wether
calibration (yet a weaker but maybe more intuitive notion) can or can not be obtained
using deterministic algorithms.
Final Section 4 contains all the reductions to approachability. We prove (or recall)
how regret minimizations (either with finite or infinite action spaces) and calibration
(either finite or with checking rules) can be obtained using approachability results from
the first section.
Maybe the most general results are, on regret minimization, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2
that provide (explicit for the first one) strategy minimizing swap regret if action space
are, respectively, finite or infinite. Proposition 4.2, due to Blackwell [10] himself, shows
how minimization of the supremum norm of regret is exactly approachability.
Concerning calibration, most striking results might be Proposition 4.5, its conse-
quence Theorem 4.4 and Theorem 4.5. They refine and generalize recent results of
Mannor & Stoltz [50] as well as Rakhlin, Sridharan and Tewari [66].
We conclude this Section by explaining how the circle is complete: if regret minimiza-
tion and calibration can be seen as specific instances of approachability, the converse is
also true. Indeed, using some generalized notions of regret and/or calibration, one can
construct approachability strategies (in the case of convex sets).
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1 Blackwell’s approachability
1.1 Approachability of arbitrary sets
Consider a two-person repeated game between a player and Nature. Their actions set
are respectively denoted by A and B (of respective cardinality A and B) and payoffs
are defined trough some vectorial mapping g : A × B → Rd. The game is repeated in
discrete time, and we denote actions chosen at stage n ∈ N by an ∈ A and bn ∈ B; they
induce a payoff gn := g(an, bn) ∈ Rd. Formally, an and bn are functions of the history,
i.e., the past observations hn−1 = (a1, b1, . . . , an−1, bn−1) ∈ (A×B)n−1 =: Hn−1.
Explicitly, a strategy σ of the player is a mapping from H :=
⋃
n∈NHn, the set
of finite histories, into ∆(A), the set of probability distributions over A. Similarly, a
strategy τ of Nature is a mapping from H into ∆(B). Kolmogorov’s extension theorem
implies that a pair (σ, τ) induces a probability distribution Pσ,τ over H = (A×B)N, the
set of infinite histories of the game embedded with the product topology.
Before defining the concept of approachability, we introduce some notations. Given
a closed set E ⊂ Rd, we denote by dE (x) = infz∈E{‖x − z‖} the distance from x to
E , by Eδ = {z ∈ Rd s.t. dE(x) < δ} the δ-open neighborhood of E , and by ΠE (x) =
{z ∈ E s.t. ‖x − z‖ = dE (x)} the projection of x onto E , which is in general non single-
valued. We also denote by co
(
E
)
the convex hull of a set. The mapping g defined
on A × B (and more generally any such mapping) is extended to ∆(A) × ∆(B) by
g(x, y) = Ex⊗y
[
g(a, b)
]
. The average of a sequence s = {sm}m∈N up to stage n ∈ N is
denoted by sn :=
∑n
m=1 sm/n.
Definition 1.1 A closed set E ⊂ Rd is approachable by the player if he has a strategy σ
ensuring, for every ε > 0, the existence of some integer Nε ∈ N such that, no matter the
strategy τ of Nature,
sup
n≥Nε
Eσ,τ
(
dE (gn)
)
≤ ε and Pσ,τ
(
sup
n≥Nε
dE(gn) ≥ ε
)
≤ ε . (1)
A set E is excludable by Nature if she can approach the complement of Eδ for some δ > 0.
Informally, a given set E ⊂ Rd is approachable by the player if he has a strategy such that
the average payoff converges almost-surely to E , uniformly with respect of the strategies
of Nature. The right hand side of Equation (1) clearly implies the first one, which is
actually the most commonly used (and rates of convergences, i.e. smallest mappings
ε 7→ Nε satisfying each condition, might differ).
1.1.1 Approachable arbitrary set : Blackwell’s sufficient condition
Blackwell [9] provided a simple geometrical condition under which a set E is approachable.
This sufficient condition is in fact almost necessary (as proved in Section 1.1.2, following
Spinat [73]).
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Definition 1.2 A closed set E ⊂ Rd is a B-set if for every z ∈ Rd, there exists a
projection π ∈ ΠE(z) and x := x(z) ∈ ∆(A) such that the hyperplane perpendicular to
z − π at z separates z from
{
g(x, y) , y ∈ ∆(B)
}
, or formally:
∀ z ∈ Rd,∃π ∈ ΠE (z),∃x ∈ ∆(A),∀ y ∈ ∆(B) : 〈g(x, y) − π, z − π〉 ≤ 0 . (2)
Blackwell [9] proved that being a B-set is sufficient for approachability ; he also exhibited
a specific strategy, from now on referred to as Blackwell (approachability) strategy.
Theorem 1.1 If E is a B-set, then E is approachable by the player. Moreover, the
strategy σ defined by σ(hn) = x(gn) ensures that, for every η > 0 and against any
strategy τ of Nature:
Eσ,τ
[
dE (gn)
]
≤ 2
√
κ0
n
and Pσ,τ
(
sup
m≥n
dE (gm) ≥ η
)
≤ 8
η2
κ0
n
, (3)
where κ0 = ‖g‖∞ := supx,y Ex,y
[
‖g(a, b)‖2
]
= supa,b ‖g(a, b)‖2.
Blackwell [9] and Mertens, Sorin & Zamir [55] obtained respectively the bounds in expec-
tation and in probability. The very definition of ‖g‖∞ allows each g(a, b) to be random
variables with bounded second moment.
We propose in the following Corollary 1.1 a slight variant that improves the constants
(in the deterministic case or when E is compact); for instance, they are divided by two
if E = {0}, as in Section 1.3.6.
Corollary 1.1 A closed set E is approachable if and only if Eg := E ∩ co
{
g(a, b) ; a ∈
A, b ∈ B} is also approachable. Blackwell’s strategy applied to Eg ensures that
Eσ,τ
[
dE (gn)
]
≤
√
κ
n
and Pσ,τ
(
sup
m≥n
dE(gm) ≥ η
)
≤ 2
η2
κ
n
,
where κ = (‖g‖∞ + ‖Eg‖)2 and ‖Eg‖ := sup
{
‖z‖ ; z ∈ Eg
}
is smaller than ‖g‖∞.
Proof: An approachability strategy of E ensures that any accumulation point of gn must
belong to both the closed set E and to the compact set co{g(a, b) ; a ∈ A, b ∈ B}, hence
to Eg. Reciprocally, any approachability strategy of Eg approaches its super-set E .
Let σ be Blackwell’s strategy applied to Eg, define δn := dE (gn) and denote by πn
any element of ΠE(gn) given by Equation (2). Definition of dE implies that
δ2n+1 ≤
∥∥gn+1 − πn∥∥2 = ∥∥∥∥ nn+ 1(gn − πn) + 1n+ 1(gn+1 − πn)
∥∥∥∥2
=
n2
(n+ 1)2
δ2n +
1
(n+ 1)2
‖gn+1 − πn‖2 + 2n
(n+ 1)2
〈gn − πn, gn+1 − πn〉 .
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Conditioning on the finite history hn and using Equation (2) as well as the definitions
of ‖g‖∞ and ‖Eg‖, the last inequality becomes
Eσ,τ
[
δ2n+1
∣∣∣ hn] ≤ n2
(n+ 1)2
δ2n +
(‖g‖∞ + ‖Eg‖)2
(n + 1)2
and, with a simple induction, Eσ,τ [δ
2
n] ≤ κ/n. Thus gn converges in probability towards
E . The almost sure convergence is a consequence of the facts that
Zn := δ
2
n +Eσ,τ
[ ∞∑
k=n
‖gk+1 − πk‖2
(k + 1)2
]
is a supermartingale and Eσ,τ [Zn] ≤ 2κ
n
.
Indeed, Doobs’ inequality (see Neveu [56], prop. IV.5.2) implies then that
Pσ,τ (∃m ≥ b s.t. Zm ≥ η2) ≤ Eσ,τ [Zn]
η2
≤ 2κ
η2n
,
which gives the result. 
Blackwell’s strategy depends only on the sequence {gn}n∈N so these results do not
require the finiteness of B or A, nor that Nature’s actions are observed. In fact, we could
as well assume the following model that we call the compact case (in opposition to the
finite case).
Action sets are compact and convex sets, denoted by X ⊂ RA and U ⊂ (Rd)A. At
stage n ∈ N, Nature chooses an outcome Un = (Uan)a∈A ∈
(
R
d
)A
in U and the player
chooses xn ∈ X . Those choices incur the vector payoff gn = xn.Un ∈ Rd, the standard
inner product between xn and Un. Condition (2) that defines B-set becomes then
∀ z ∈ Rd, ∃π ∈ ΠE(z), inf
x∈X
sup
U∈U
〈x.U − π, z − π〉 ≤ 0 .
It is also possible to incorporate randomness in this model. The compact and convex
sets X and U can be sets of probability distribution (this was the case when X = ∆(A))
and in that case x.U is the expectation of a random payoff associated with x and U (that
must have a second moment).
1.1.2 Equivalent formulations and necessary condition
Blackwell defined geometrically a B-set from outside. As Soulaimani, Quincampoix &
Sorin [2] noticed that it can also be defined similarly from inside. Informally, one can
interpret these definitions slightly differently: instead of viewing approachability as the
convergence of average payoffs to E , it can be understood as preventing average payoffs
from escaping E .
First, we need to recall the notion of proximal normals to E .
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Definition 1.3 The set of normal proximal to some closed set E ⊂ Rd at e ∈ E is
denoted by NPE (e) ⊂ Rd and is defined by:
NPE(e) :=
{
p ∈ Rd, dE (e+ p) = ‖p‖
}
=
{
p ∈ Rd, B(e+ p, ‖p‖) ∩ E = ∅},
where B
(
e+ p, ‖p‖) is the open ball of center e+ p and radius ‖p‖.
The equivalent definition of a B-set, which is closely related to the notion of discrim-
inant set in differential games, is given by the following lemma whose proof is immediate
and omitted.
Lemma 1.2 A set E is a B-set if and only if:
∀ e ∈ E , ∀p ∈ NPE (e), min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
〈p, g(x, y) − e〉 ≤ 0. (4)
Interesting results on a slightly different (but equivalent as we shall see) notion of
approachability that can be found in the literature can be easily derived from this alter-
native definition of B-set.
Definition 1.4 Given ε > 0, a closed set E ⊂ Rd is ε-approachable by the player if he
has a strategy σε ensuring that, after some stage Nε ∈ N, no matter the strategy τ of
Nature,
sup
n≥Nε
Eσε,τ
(
dE (gn)
)
≤ ε and Pσε,τ
(
sup
n≥Nε
dE(gn) ≥ ε
)
≤ ε . (5)
And a set E is 0-approachable if it is ε-approachable for every ε > 0.
The difference between approachability and ε-approachability is wether the strategy
can depend on ε or not. It is clear that an approachable set is 0-approachable but
the converse is not immediate. It is easier to show – following Spinat [73] and thanks
to Lemma 1.3 – that a 0-approachable set must contain a B-set and so both notions
coincide.
Lemma 1.3 Let {En}n∈N be a decreasing sequence of compact non-empty 0-approachable
sets, then E∞ := ∩n∈NEn is also a compact non-empty 0-approachable set.
Proof: One just has to notice that, for every ε > 0, the ε/2 neighborhood of E∞ is
included in some En which is ε/2-approachable. And an ε/2-approachability strategy of
En will ε-approach E . 
Lemma 1.3 is not trivially true for approachability1. Indeed, one must find an ap-
proachability strategy that is independent of ε and a simple concatenation of those σε
might not work (except in the specific case of convex sets).
1S. Mannor pointed out this interesting property.
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Proposition 1.4 If a closed set E is 0-approachable, it contains a B-set.
We only provide a sketch of the proof, complete details can be found in Spinat [73].
Proof: Consider the family of every compact subset of E that are 0-approachable.
It is a non-empty family, ordered by inclusion and, because of Lemma 1.3, every fully
ordered subset has a minorant (the intersection of all elements of this subset) which
belongs to this family. Thus Zorn’s lemma yield that a minimal element E∞ exists and
we claim that E∞ is a B-set.
Indeed, assume the converse: condition (4) does not hold for some e ∈ E∞ and some
proximal normal p ∈ NPE∞(e). So there exists y0 ∈ ∆(B) such that
0 < min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
〈
p, g(x, y)−e〉 = max
y∈∆(B)
min
x∈∆(A)
〈
p, g(x, y)−e〉 =: min
x∈∆(A)
〈
p, g(x, y0)−e
〉
.
In particular, Definition 1.3 of proximal normals implies that, at least for some small
λ ∈ (0, 1), (1−λ)e+λg(x, y0) belongs, for every x ∈ ∆(A), to B (e+ p, ‖p‖). Therefore,
∃ δ > 0, ∀x ∈ ∆(A), dE∞
(
(1− λ)e+ λg(x, y0)
)
≥ δ . (6)
By continuity, Equation (6) holds (up to δ/2 instead of δ) on a small open neighborhood
V of e. We shall prove that this implies that E∞\V is still 0-approachable ; it is a
contradiction with the minimality of E∞ which must therefore be a B-set.
Assume that at some stage n ∈ N, gn belongs to V and that Nature plays repeatedly
accordingly to y0 after. Then if n is large enough, there exists some large m ∈ N such
that mn+m and gn+m are, respectively and with arbitrarily high probability, arbitrarily
close to λ and to some (1− λ)gn + λg(x, y0), which is at δ/2 from E∞.
Consider a δ/4-approachability strategy of E∞ denoted by σδ/4. For some large
N ∈ N independent of τ , the Pσδ/4,τ -probability that gn belongs to V for some n ≥ N
must therefore be smaller than δ/4. In particular, this implies that gn stays within δ
of E∞\V with probability greater than 1 − δ. Thus, for every δ > 0, there exists a
δ-approachability strategy of E∞\V . 
A direct consequence of Theorem 1.1 and Proposition 1.4 is the characterization of
approachable sets.
Theorem 1.2 A closed set E is approachable if and only if it contains a B-set.
1.2 Specific case of convex sets
In the specific case of convex sets, there exists a dual and complete characterization of
approachability and excludability due to Blackwell [9]. It is somehow a consequence of
the fact that, for any z in some closed and convex set C ⊂ Rd one has:
NPC(z) =
{
p ∈ Rd s.t. 〈p, c− z〉 ≤ 0, ∀c ∈ C
}
; (7)
in particular this implies that NPC(z) is a cone, referred to as the normal cone.
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1.2.1 Complete characterization of approachable convex set.
Theorem 1.3 A closed and convex set C ⊂ Rd is approachable by the player if and only
if:
∀ y ∈ ∆(B), ∃x ∈ ∆(A), g(x, y) ∈ C. (8)
And a convex set is either approachable by the player or excludable by Nature.
Proof: Let C ⊂ Rd be a convex set and p ∈ Rd be a normal proximal of C at some
z ∈ C. Because of Property (7), Condition (8) can be immediately rewritten into
max
y∈∆(B)
min
x∈∆(A)
〈p, g(x, y) − z〉 ≤ 0.
The mapping (x, y) 7→ 〈p, g(x, y)− z〉 is linear in both of its argument, so von Neumann
minmax theorem implies that operator min and max can be switched, i.e.,
min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
〈p, g(x, y) − z〉 = max
y∈∆(B)
min
x∈∆(A)
〈p, g(x, y) − z〉 ≤ 0, (9)
thus C is a B-set and is approachable by the player.
On the contrary, if Condition (8) is not satisfied, there exists some y0 ∈ ∆(B) such
that g(x, y0) 6∈ C for every x ∈ ∆(A). By continuity, there exists δ > 0 such that
dC(g(x, y0)) ≥ δ. If Nature plays repeatedly accordingly to y0, then the law of large
numbers implies that gn converges uniformly to the set of {g(x, y0), x ∈ ∆(A)} which
is included in the complement of Cδ. So C is excludable by Nature and, of course, is not
approachable by the player. 
Proof of Theorem 1.3 relies on the Hilbertian structure of Rd. However, using differ-
ent arguments, it can be generalized to any normed space, see Theorem 1.7.
Remark 1.1 In the specific case of a convex set, Blackwell strategy at stage n+ 1 ∈ N
can be decomposed as follows:
i) Given gn ∈ Rd, compute its projection ΠC(gn) on the closed and convex set C;
ii) Solve the projected zero-sum game defined by Equation (9), i.e., find xn+1 ∈ ∆(A)
that minimizes this problem and choose an+1 accordingly to it.
These steps ensure that xn+1 = x(gn) as introduced in Definition 1.2. So Blackwell strat-
egy reduces to a projection onto a convex set and the resolution of some linear program
(solving a zero-sum game can be reduced to the latter, see Sorin [70], appendix A).
On the other hand, checking wether a convex set is approachable or not, i.e., if it
satisfies Condition (8) (or equivalently the more complicate Condition (2)) is NP-hard,
even with C = {0}. Mannor & Tsilikis [53] has indeed reduced this to the 3-SAT problem.
In the compact case where action set are X ⊂ RA and U ⊂ ([0, 1]d)A, a closed convex
C ⊂ Rd is approachable if and only if
∀U ∈ U , ∃x ∈ ∆(A), x.U ∈ C.
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1.2.2 Sharper high probability bounds
In this section, we use the convexity of C to exhibit high probability bounds improving
Corollary 1.1.
Corollary 1.5 If C ⊂ Rd is a closed and convex approachable set, Blackwell strategy
ensures that for every η > 0 and against any strategy τ of Nature :
Pσ,τ
(
sup
m≥n
dC(gm)−
2‖g‖∞√
m
≥ η
)
≤ 4 exp
(
− η
2n
32‖g‖2∞
)
. (10)
Proof: Distance to a convex set is Lipschitz and convex, so{
sup
m≥n
dC(gm)−
2‖g‖∞√
m
≥ η
}
⊂
{
sup
m≥n
dC
(
E
[
gm
])
+
∥∥∥gm − E[gm]∥∥∥− 2‖g‖∞√m ≥ η
}
⊂
{
sup
m≥n
E
[
dC
(
gm
)]
+
∥∥∥gm − E[gm]∥∥∥− 2‖g‖∞√m ≥ η
}
⊂
{
sup
m≥n
∥∥∥gm − E[gm]∥∥∥ ≥ η} ,
where the third inclusion is a consequence of the rate of convergence of Blackwell strategy.
We conclude using Lemma 5.3. 
This result must be put in perspective with Corollary 1.1 that states that, for any arbi-
trary approachable set E and every η > 0, Pσ,τ
(
supm≥n dE(gm) ≥ η
) ≤ (η2n/8‖g‖2∞)−1.
1.2.3 Biased approachability
We assume in this section that the closed and convex set C ⊂ Rd is not approachable by
the player. In that case, the natural extension of Blackwell strategy would be defined by
σ(hn) = xn+1 ∈ ∆(A), where xn is optimal in the projected zero-sum game with payoffs
〈g(x, y) −ΠC(gn), gn −ΠC(gn)〉.
Corollary 1.6 Even if a closed and convex set C ⊂ Rd is not approachable by the player,
Blackwell’s strategy σ ensures that
Eσ,τ
[
dC (gn)− δ
]
≤
√
κ
n
+
δ√
n
, where δ = sup
y∈∆(B)
inf
x∈∆(A)
dC(g(x, y).
Proof: We only need to prove that σ is in fact exactly Blackwell’s approachability strat-
egy of the closure of Cδ (the δ-neighborhood of C) which is by definition and Condition (8)
approachable. This is simply due to the fact that:
∀z 6∈ Cδ, ΠCδ (z) = ΠC(z) + δ
z −ΠC(z)
‖z −ΠC(z)‖ .
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Indeed, Cδ = C+δB(0, 1), so ΠCδ(z) minimizes ‖z−(c+δe)‖2 = ‖z−c‖2−2δ〈z−c, e〉+δ2
over (c, e) ∈ C×B(0, 1). And necessarily, one must have e = (z−c)/‖z−c‖ and c = ΠC(z).
The results follows from the fact that dCδ (z) ≤ dC(z) + δ and ‖Cδ‖ ≤ ‖C‖+ δ. 
The key ingredient of Corollary 1.6 is not the rates of convergence (which are a direct
consequence of the fact that Cδ is approachable), but the fact that it does not require
the computation of δ and Cδ (we recall that determining if a convex set is NP-hard, thus
determining the smallest approachable extension is even more complex). Notice that if
C is approachable, rates of Condition 8 and Corollary 1.6 and of Theorem 1.1 match.
This result has to be put in perspective with the following proposition that also deals
with biased approachability, yet on different level.
Proposition 1.7 Assume that player and Nature strategies generates a sequence of pay-
offs such that, at every stage n,
〈gn − πE(gn),Eσ,τ
[
gn+1
∣∣hn]− πE(gn)〉 ≤ εn,
for some sequence εn. Then
Eσ,τ
[
dE (gn)
2
]
≤ κ
n
+
2
∑n
m=1mεm
(n+ 1)2
and
Pσ,τ
(
sup
m≥n
dE (gm) ≥ η
)
≤ 2κ+ 2
∑∞
m=n
εm
m
η2n
.
In particular, if εn converges to 0, then gn converges in expectation to E; the conver-
gence is almost sure as soon as
∑
n∈N
εn
n <∞.
Proof: The proof is identical to the one of Corollary 1.1. 
Actually, the result is stated for arbitrary sets and holds for non-deterministic se-
quences of εn. On the other hand, for convex sets, concentration inequalities introduced
in the previous section show that
Pσ,τ
{
sup
m≥n
d2C(gm)−
2
∑m
s=1 sεs
(m+ 1)2
≥ η
}
≤ 3 exp
(
− Mη,n
2
)
thus gn converges almost surely to C as soon as εn goes (in expectation) to 0.
1.3 Generalizations and extensions
1.3.1 Deterministic approachability and procedures in law
As mentioned in Section 1.1.1, Blackwell’s approachability strategy does not use the fact
that actions chosen by Nature are observed, as it is only required to observe the sequence
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of payoffs. In fact, it is not even required that the random variable gn = g(an, bn) is
perfectly observed.
Indeed, denote by γn the observation made after stage n, and assume it is equal to
either g(xn, bn) or g(xn, yn), where xn and yn are mixed action of stage n (i.e., laws of
an or bn). Blackwell’s strategy applied to the sequence of γn ensures that the sequence
of deterministic averages γn converges to E , uniformly with respect to Nature’s strategy.
To conclude that this describes an approachability strategy, it remains to notice that
dE (gn) ≤ dE (γn)+
∥∥gn−γn∥∥ and that the norm of gn−γn converges almost surely to zero,
because it is an average of bounded martingale differences (using classical concentration
arguments to get rates of convergence independent of strategies).
1.3.2 Approachability in infinite dimension spaces
We assume in this section that g no longer takes value in some Euclidian space. Formally,
there exists a probability space (Ω, µ,F) such that, for every a ∈ A and b ∈ B, g(a, b) ∈
L2(Ω, µ,F) – g is extended to ∆(A) × ∆(B) as before. The finite case can be easily
embedded into this framework by defining, Ω = {1, . . . , d} and µ = 1d
∑d
k=1 δk.
In this context, notions of approachability slightly differ, as the uniform convergence
with respect to Nature’s strategy is not required:
Definition 1.5 A closed set E ⊂ Rd is approachable by the player if he has a strategy
σ ensuring that, no matter the strategy τ of Nature, gn converges µ-almost surely to E,
for Pσ,τ -almost every histories.
A set E is excludable by Nature if she can approach the complement of Eδ for some
δ > 0.
Lehrer [42] has proved that the natural inner product of L2(Ω, µ,F) allows to extend
the definition of B-sets and Blackwell’s characterization of approachable convex sets still
holds (Equation (8), in the previous section).
Theorem 1.4 A closed convex set C is approachable if and only if
∀ y ∈ ∆(B), ∃x ∈ ∆(A), g(x, y) ∈ C. (11)
The proof relies on the following geometric principle, adapted from Lehrer [42].
Lemma 1.8 Let C be a closed convex subset of L2(Ω, µ,F). If, for every n ∈ N, gn
is bounded µ-as by M ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F) and 〈gn − ΠC(gn), gn+1 − ΠC(gn)〉 ≤ 0 , then gn
converges µ-as to C.
Proof: Let us denote fn = gn −ΠC(gn). The finite dimensional arguments of the proof
of Corollary 1.1 imply that
∥∥∥fn∥∥∥ ≤ 2‖M‖/√n thus gn converges in probability to C.
The almost sure convergence is a consequence of the fact that∥∥∥fn+1 − fn∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥(gn+1 − gn)− (ΠC(gn+1)−ΠC(gn))∥∥∥ ≤ 2∥∥∥gn+1 − gn∥∥∥ ≤ 4‖M‖n+ 1
13
so fn has small increments and we conclude using the technical Lemma 5.4. 
Convexity of C is only used to get a Lipschitzian projection.
Proof of Theorem 1.4: Every arguments behind the proof of Theorem 1.3 hold
in L2(Ω, µ,F). Therefore, a closed convex set satisfying Blackwell condition remains a
B-set with respect to the natural inner product of L2(Ω, µ,F).
Assume that C is a B-set and consider Blackwell’s strategy, denoted as usual by σ
(and τ is Nature’s strategy). Let µ ⊗ Pσ,τ be the product measure on Ω ×H on which
we define the random variable g˜n by g˜n[ω, h] = g˜n(an, bn)[ω] where (an, bn) is the pair
of actions played at stage n accordingly to h. Since A and B are finite, gn and g˜n are
uniformly bounded and the sequence g˜n satisfies the geometric principle.
As a consequence, g˜n converges µ⊗Pσ,τ -as to C which is therefore approachable. 
1.3.3 Approachability with infinite action space – non-linear approachability
It is also possible to generalize the previous results when actions spaces are not necessarily
finite but two subsets of a given topological space, denoted by X and Y. Payoff mapping
g is now a function from X ×Y into L2(Ω, µ,F). In particular, it is not required in this
section that g is linear in each of its variable.
Theorem 1.5 Assume the following regularity assumptions on g:
a) there exists M ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F) such that g(x, y) ≤M , µ-as, for every x, y ∈ X × Y;
b) for every y ∈ Y, G(y), the closure of {g(x, y), x ∈ X}, is a compact and convex set.
c) for every u ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F) such that supc∈C〈c, u〉 < +∞, the zero-sum game with
payoffs defined by 〈u, g(x, y)〉 has a value.
Then it holds that
i) Blackwell’s characterization of convex approachable set holds :
C is approachable (in pure strategy) if and only if ∀ y ∈ Y, G(y) ∩ C 6= ∅;
ii) C is approachable if and only if for every z ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F):
sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
〈z −ΠC(z), g(x, y) −ΠC(z)〉 ≤ 0.
iii) If there exists y0 such that G(y0) ∩ C = ∅, then C is excludable by Nature;
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Proof: The deterministic approachability strategy associated with Blackwell’s charac-
terization is defined as follows. Denote as before by gn ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F) the average payoff
up to stage n. Since ΠC is the projection onto a convex set, one has
sup
c∈C
〈c, gn −ΠC(gn), 〉 ≤ 〈ΠC(gn), gn −ΠC(gn)〉 < +∞.
Assumption c) ensures that the game with payoff 〈g(x, y) −ΠC(gn), gn −ΠC(gn)〉 has a
value which is, using Blackwell characterization, less or equal than 0. The approachability
strategy consists in playing xn ∈ X , any 2−n-optimal strategy of the latter game, i.e.,
sup
y∈Y
〈g(xn, y)−ΠC(gn), gn −ΠC(gn)〉 ≤
1
2n
.
The fact that this describes an approachability strategy follows from arguments used in
the proof of Corollary 1.1 and technical Lemma 5.4.
Assume that Blackwell’s condition does not hold, i.e., there exists y0 such that G(y0)∩
C = ∅; Nature, by playing repeatedly y0, can ensure that gn belongs to G(y0). The
intersection between the closed convex set C and the compact convex set G(y0) is empty,
so they can be strictly separated. Since Nature can approach G(y0), C is excludable, thus
not approachable. 
Assumption b) is required to get point iii). Second conditions of i) and ii) are
sufficient for approachability (but not necessary).
When actions sets A and B are finite, the projected game with payoff 〈g(a, b), u〉
typically does not have a value for some u ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F); so we considered instead mixed
actions and strategies. This can be generalized when actions space are two measurable
sets (A, A) and (B, B), using the same tools as for procedures in law, see Section 1.3.1.
Denote by X and Y the sets of probability distributions onto (A, A) and (B, B),
embedded with the weak-⋆ topology ; the mapping g is extended to X ×Y multi-linearly
as usual. Then, under mild assumptions (for example if A and B are compact and g is
continuous, see e.g. Sorin [70]), the projected game with payoff 〈g(x, y), u〉 has a value
(at least for every u such that supc∈C〈c, u〉 < +∞). So C is approachable with respect
to action sets X and Y. In particular, there exists an approachability strategy such that
the averages of observed payoffs γn = g(xn, bn), where xn ∈ X is the action dictated to
be played at stage n, converge to C – and the rate of convergence is O (1/√n).
Similarly to Section 1.3.1, this is an approachability strategy of C since gn−γn is again
an average of bounded Martingale differences, and concentration inequalities of sums of
bounded martingales differences in any Hilbert spaces, see e.g. Chen & White [15], imply
that, in expectation and with great probability,
∥∥∥gn − γn∥∥∥ ≤ O(1/√n). Almost sure
convergence is again a consequence of Lemma 5.4.
1.3.4 Approachability with activation
This section is concerned with the case where only a fragment of all coordinates of the
payoff vector (belonging to L2(Ω, µ,F)) are active at each stage. Formally, there exists a
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mapping X : H → L2(Ω, µ,F) such that, after any finite history hn = (a1, b1, . . . , an, bn),
X [hn] ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F) has value in {0, 1} and only the coordinates ω ∈ Ω with X [hn](ω) =
1 are active. In particular, wether a coordinate is active at a stage might depend on
choices of actions of this specific stage. We also assume that X [hn] increases µ-almost
surely to infinity, no matter the pair of strategies.
In this framework, we denote tilted averages of payoffs by
gX ,n :=
∑n
m=1 X [hm]g(am, bm)∑n
m=1 X [hm]
(with the convention that
0
0
= 0).
A set E ⊂ L2(Ω, µ,F) is approachable if the player has a strategy σ such that, for any
strategy τ of Nature, the sequence gX ,n − ΠE (gX ,n) converges to zero µ-almost surely,
for Pσ,τ -almost all infinite histories.
We will only focus on product sets, that can be described by
C =
{
f ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F) , f0 ≤ f on Ω0 and f ≤ f1 on Ω1
}
where Ω0 and Ω1 are two measurable subsets of Ω and f0, f1 ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F). The following
theorem shows that, in this specific framework, a notion of tilted B-set is sufficient for
approachability
Theorem 1.6 Let C ⊂ L2(Ω, µ,F) be a product set. Then any strategy σ such that, for
any strategy τ of Nature, and for Pσ,τ -almost every infinite history,〈 X [hn+1]∑n
m=1 X [hm]
(
gX ,n −ΠC(gX ,n)
)
, g(xn+1, yn+1)−ΠC(gX ,n)
〉
≤ 0,
where xn+1 = σ(h
n) and yn+1 = τ(h
n), is an approachability strategy of C.
The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 1.4, except that Lemma 5.5 is used instead
of Lemma 1.8, so it is omitted.
The next proposition shows that approachability with activation of a product set
C =∏dk=1 Ck ⊂ Rd in Euclidian spaces can actually be reduced to usual approachability.
The only condition is that activation at stage n depends only of current actions (i.e.,
X [hn] = X (an, bn) where X (a, b) might be a random variable); we also assume, without
loss of generality, that the origin belongs to C and even that C =∏dk=1[0, bk] ⊂ Rd.
Proposition 1.9 A product set C ⊂ Rd is approachable with activation depending only
on current actions if and only if the following convex set
C˜ :=
{
(z, ω) ∈ Rd ×Rd+;
(
zk
ωk
)
k∈{1,...,d}
∈ C
}
with the convention that
0
0
= 0
is approachable in the game with payoffs defined by
g˜X (a, b) =
(
gX (a, b),X (a, b)
)
∈ Rd×Rd+, where gX (a, b) =
(X k(a, b)gk(a, b))
k∈{1,...,d}.
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Moreover, there exists a strategy such that, in expectation,
dC
(
gX ,n
) ≤ 4‖g‖2∞√
n
1
X n
,with X n = inf
{
X kn s.t. X kn :=
∑n
m=1 X k(am, bm)
n
> 0
}
.
Proof: Consider any fixed (z, ω) ∈ Rd×Rd; we can always assume that every coordinates
of ω are non equal to 0. Indeed, since C is a product set, dC
(
(zk/ωk)k
)
= dC
(
(ẑk/ω̂k)k
)
where (ẑk, ω̂k) = (zk, ωk) if ωk 6= 0 and (ẑk, ωk) = (ck, 1) with ck arbitrarily chosen in
Ck if ωk = 0.
Define (ze, ωe) ∈ ΠC˜
(
z, ω
)
and ω the smallest coordinate of ω. Since C =∏dk=1[0, bk],
then C˜ =∏dk=1 {(zk, ωk); 0 ≤ zk ≤ bkωk}, thus necessarily
ωk ≤ ωke ≤ ωk
‖g‖∞ + 1
bk + 1
≤ (‖g‖∞ + 1)ωk.
As a consequence,
dC
( z
ω
)
≤
∥∥∥∥ zω − zeωe
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1ω ‖z − ze‖+ ‖z‖ supk
∣∣∣∣ 1ωk − 1ωke
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2‖g‖∞ dC˜(z, ω)ω .
Reciprocally,
dC˜(z, ω) ≤
∥∥∥(z, ω) − ((ωk ΠkC ( zω))k , ω)
∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥ z
ω
−ΠC
( z
ω
)∥∥∥ ≤ dC ( z
ω
)
.
Finally, if C is a product set containing 0, then C˜ is a convex cone. The result is a
consequence of Blackwell’s characterization of approachable sets. 
Assuming that the origin belongs to the product set C is of course non-restrictive,
one can always choose to transform the origin into any point. Moreover, in some cases,
product set property can be relaxed. For instance, if there exists two coordinates ℓ and
ℓ′ that are always active together, i.e., if X (a, b)ℓ = X (a, b)ℓ′ for every pair (a, b), then
the results holds if C :=∏k 6∈{ℓ,ℓ′} Ck×Cℓ,ℓ′ where the convex set Cℓ,ℓ′ ⊂ R2 does not need
to be a product set.
1.3.5 Variable stage duration
Cesaro averages of payoffs are considered in the usual definition of approachability. In
this section, we make the implicit assumption that all stages does not have the same
weights (when computing averages) or, equivalently, that they do not have the same
length duration: payoffs obtained on long stages must have more importance than on
short stages. We distinguish two classes of variable and random stage duration: wether
they depend or not on the actions chosen.
Assume for the moment that ωn, the maybe random length (or weight) of the n-th
stage, is independent of actions chosen by player and Nature. In this context, σ is an
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approachability strategy of a closed set E if gω,n :=
∑n
m=1 ωmgm/
∑n
m=1 ωm converges
to E , Pσ,τ -almost surely, uniformly with respect to the strategy τ of Nature. It will be
convenient to define Ωn =
∑n
m=1 ωm.
Proposition 1.10 Let E ⊂ Rd be a closed B-set. Then Blackwell’s strategy applied to
the sequence of weighted averages gω,n ensures that for every n ∈ N and η > 0
Eσ,τ
[
dE
(
gω,n
) ] ≤√∑nm=1 ω2m
Ω2n
κ and
Pσ,τ
{
∃m ≥ n , dE
(
gω,m
) ≥ η} ≤ [∑nm=1 ω2m
Ω2n
+
∞∑
k=n+1
(
ωk
Ωk
)2] κ
η2
.
The proof is absolutely identical with Cesaro averages (when ωn = 1 for every n ∈ N)
thus omited. In particular, for any polynomial weights, i.e. if ωn = n
α with α > −1, a
B-set is approachable at the rate of convergence of O (1/
√
n), which is independent of
α – only the constant depends on α, see e.g. Mannor, Perchet & Stoltz [52].
In fact, as we shall see in the following Section 1.4.1, a B-set is approachable as soon
as the usual Robbins-Monroe assumptions are satisfied almost surely:
∑
n∈N
ωn
Ωn
= +∞ and
∑
n∈N
(
ωn
Ωn
)2
<∞ .
We now turn to the case where a stage length might depend on the actions of the
player and Nature. For simplicity, we assume that there exists a mapping ω : A× B →
[ω, ω] ⊂ (0, 1] such that ωn := ω(an, bn). Approachability in this framework can be
reduced to regular approachability, similarly to what has be done with activation.
Proposition 1.11 A closed set E ⊂ Rd is approachable with respect to weighted averages
if and only if the following cone E˜ is approachable with Cesaro averages
E˜ =
{
(z, ω) ∈ Rd × [ω, ω] ; z
ω
∈ E
}
.
Moreover, if E is convex then E˜ is also convex, thus E is approachable with respect to
weighted averages if and only if
∀ y ∈ ∆(B), ∃x ∈ ∆(A),
Ex,y
[
ω(a, b)g(a, b)
]
Ex,y
[
ω(a, b)
] ∈ E .
Proof: Let (z, ω) ∈ Rd × [ω, ω] and (ze, ωe) ∈ ΠE˜
(
z, ω
)
, then
dE
( z
ω
)
≤
∥∥∥∥ zω − zeωe
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1ω ‖z − ze‖+ ‖z‖
∣∣∣∣ 1ω − 1ωe
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ( 1ω + ‖g‖∞ω2
)
dE˜ (z, ω).
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As before, one has reciprocally,
dE˜(z, ω) ≤
∥∥∥(z, ω) − (ωΠE ( z
ω
)
, ω
)∥∥∥ ≤ ω ∥∥∥ z
ω
−ΠE
( z
ω
)∥∥∥ ≤ ω dE ( z
ω
)
.
If E is convex, then E˜ is a convex cone and the characterization of approachable convex
set (in this framework due to Mannor and Shimkin [49]) is a simple consequence of
Condition (8). 
1.3.6 Unbounded payoffs and strong law of large numbers
At the end of Section 1.1.1, we noticed that we can assume that Nature choose outcomes
U in some given compact set U ⊂ (Rd)A such that the player’s payoff is, in expectation,
x.U . The fact that U is a fixed compact set can be weakened (similarly to Stoltz [74]),
and we can assume that Un belongs to Un ⊂
(
R
d
)A
as long as
∑
n∈N
∥∥Un∥∥2
(n+ 1)2
<∞ or even
∑
n∈N
Eσ,τ
[‖an.Un‖2]
(n+ 1)2
<∞ ,
with a convergence uniform with respect to Nature’s strategy.
Indeed, under this assumption, the proof of Theorem 1.1 does not change, i.e., if
condition (2) is satisfied at every stage, then the same arguments yield that
Eσ,τ
[
δ2n
]
≤ 2
∑n
m=1Eσ,τ
[
‖am.Um‖2
]
+ ‖Eg‖2
n2
and Zn is a supermartingale such that
Eσ,τ
[
Zn
]
≤ 4‖Eg‖
2
n
+ 2
∑nm=1Eσ,τ
[
‖am.Um‖2
]
n2
+
∞∑
m=n+1
Eσ,τ
[
‖am.Um‖2
]
m2
 .
By assumption, every terms goes to zero uniformly with respect to Nature’s strategy,
hence E is approachable.
This sheds new lights on approachability theory: it can be seen as a generalization of
Kolmogorov strong law of large numbers (see Feller [20], chapter X.7 and Mertens, Sorin
& Zamir [55], exercice 4, page 104). Indeed, Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence of independent
random variable in Rd and define vn := E
[∥∥Xn −E[Xn]∥∥2]. As soon as ∑n∈N vn/n2 is
bounded, Xn − E
[
Xn
]
converges almost-surely to 0; moreover
P
{
∃m ≥ n;
∥∥∥Xm −E[Xm]∥∥∥ ≥ η} ≤ 1
η2
(∑n
m=1 vm
n2
+
∞∑
m=n+1
vm
m2
)
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or even with an exponential decay (since {0} is convex, see Section 1.2.2).
Finally, the approachability bound (in expectation) matches the optimal bound in
the law of large number and thus is in some sense optimal. Indeed, if Xn is an i.i.d.
sequence such that Xn = ±1 with probability 1/2, then by denoting E = {0}, one has
E
[∣∣Xn∣∣2] = E [dE (Xn)] = 1
n
=
κ
n
.
1.3.7 Bounded memory
Blackwell’s approachability strategy does not require to know at each stage the whole
sequence of past payoffs, but only the current average. Nonetheless, to update this
average either stage number of the complete history must be kept in memory which takes
of course an increasing required size of memory. This is why the question of wether it is
possible to approach a closed set E using simpler strategies, for example implementable
by a finite automata or with a finite memory, arises.
A strategy σ has a bounded memory of sizeM ∈ N if, for every finite history hn ∈ Hn,
σ(hn) depends only on
(
an−M+1, bn−M+1, . . . , an, bn
)
, i.e. the last M profiles of actions
played. Lehrer & Solan [44, 46] proved that an approachable convex set C remains
approachable by a player if it is restricted to use strategies with a bounded memory of
size M ∈ N; indeed, the average payoff converges to some O(1/√M)-neighborhood of C.
The basic idea is relatively natural; play Blackwell’s strategy on a block of size M ,
then erase the memory and start over. It is only necessary to encode the beginning (and
the end) of a block, but this can be done using
√
M stages, for examples by playing
always the same action and by ensuring that no such sequence appears in the same bloc.
The average payoff on each block will be 1/
√
M close to C which is convex, hence the
overall average payoff is also 1/
√
M of C.
On the other hand, Zapechelnyuk [82] considered the strategy with bounded memory
directly adapted from Blackwell’s, that is defined by σ(hn) = x
(
gMn
)
, where x(·) is given
by the definition of a B-set and gMn is the average payoff on the last M stages. For
instance, we are interested by this strategy in the game where payoffs of player (that
chooses a row) are given by the following matrix:
L R
T (0,-1) (0,1)
B (1,0) (-1,0)
and C = R2−. For M big enough, there exists a strategy of Nature such that the sequence(
gMn
)
n∈N enters a cycle (of length either 2M or 2M + 2). Roughly speaking, this latter
is defined by four successive blocks of lengths M/2 (or M/2 + 1) where within a block,
the same pair of actions (except on at most one stage) is played. And one can show that
the order of these actions is (T,L), (T,R), (B,R) et (B,L).
At the end of the blocks (B,R) and (T,L), gMn is close, respectively to (−1/2, 1/2)
or (1/2,−1/2). So it is at a distance of around 1/2 from C, and the sequence (gMn )n∈N
of averages of payoffs on the M last stages does not converge to C.
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However, nothing indicates wether the sequence gn does or does not converge to C
(which is the case in this example).
1.4 Alternative techniques and proofs of approachability
1.4.1 Approachability in continuous time
Benaïm, Hofbauer & Sorin [7] noticed that Blackwell’s approachability strategy of a
B-set E satisfies the following recurrence relation: condionnaly to hn,
1
1/n + 1
(
Eσ,τ
[
gn+1
∣∣ hn]− gn) ∈ T (gn)− gn,
where T (z) =
{
ω ∈ Rd; ‖ω‖ ≤ ‖g‖∞ and ∃ p ∈ ΠE(z), 〈z − p, ω − p〉 ≤ 0
}
. Therefore,
the sequence of averages payoff {gn}n∈N is a Discrete Stochasitic Approximation (a
DSA for short) of g, solution of the associated ordinary differential inclusion
g˙ ∈ T (g) − g, g(0) = g0 ∈ Rd.
The derivative of the mapping δ(t) = d2C(g(t)) satisfies δ
′(t) ≤ −2δ(t)/t thus it is a
Lyapounov function and δ(t) ≤ δ(0)t−2. As a consequence, g converges to E and, as an
DSA, the sequence {gn}n∈N converges a.s. to E . However, rates of convergence of DSA
are usually not explicit and might not be uniform.
To circumvent this issue, one might consider procedures in law, as defined in Sec-
tion 1.3.1, that are deterministic and thus can be represented as an Euler Scheme of the
associated ordinary differential inclusion. They might provide explicit rates as the differ-
ence between the average payoff and its expectation converges to zero, and is controlled
by concentration inequalities (see Sorin [72] or Kwon [40]).
As Soulaimani, Quincampoix & Sorin [2] have considered an auxiliary differential
game D where control spaces of the player and Nature are respectively X = ∆(A) and
Y = ∆(B)) and the game dynamic is given by:
d
dt
g(t) =
−g(t) + g(x(t), y(t))
t
, g(0) = 0.
The intuition is that g(t) = 1t
∫ t
0 g(x(s), y(s))ds is the average payoff at time t. The
change of variables t = es and g(s) = g(es) modifies the dynamic into
d
dt
g(s) = −g(s) + g(x(s), y(s)) := f(g(s), x(s), y(s)), g(0) = g(1).
This transformation proves the characterization of a B-set given in Equation (4). Indeed,
a set E is approachable if the player can force the dynamic to stay within E . Therefore,
a closed set E is a B-set if and only if it is a discriminating domain for the player with
respect to the dynamic f , i.e. if
∀p ∈ C,∀q ∈ NCC(p), sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
〈f(p, x, y), q〉 ≤ 0.
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1.4.2 Information-based strategies
Blackwell’s strategy is a payoff-based strategy as the running relevant state variable is
the sequence of average payoffs. We develop in this section a conceptually completely
different kind of strategy based on the sequence of observed profile of action played, as
in Perchet & Quincampoix [63] or Mannor, Perchet & Stoltz [51].
The basic idea follows from the following simple fact. Define θn = δan,bn ∈ ∆(A×B)
as the Dirac mass on (an, bn) ∈ A × B and let θn =
∑n
m=1 θm/n be their average. By
definition, gn = Eθn [g(a, b)] belongs to E if and only if θn belongs to the following set
E˜ :=
{
θ ∈ ∆(A× B) s.t. Eθ[g(a, b)] ∈ E
}
⊂ ∆(A×B).
If E is closed and convex, then E˜ (seen as a subset of RA×B) is also closed and convex;
it remains to compare distance between E and E˜ .
Lemma 1.12 There exists γ > 0 such that, for any probability measure θ ∈ ∆(A× B)
and any set E
γdE˜
(
θ
)
≤ dE
(
Eθ[g(a, b)]
)
≤ ‖g‖∞
√
ABdE˜
(
θ
)
.
Proof: For any θ ∈ ∆(A×B), define g(θ) = Eθ[g(a, b)]. Let θ ∈ ΠE˜(θ), so g(θ) ∈ E and
dE
(
g(θ)
)
≤
∥∥∥g(θ)− g(θ)∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
a,b
(
θ(a, b)− θ(a, b)
)
g(a, b)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ ‖g‖∞
∥∥θ − θ∥∥
1
≤ ‖g‖∞
√
AB
∥∥θ − θ∥∥
2
This gives the second inequality.
For the first inequality, notice that g : ∆(A× B) ⊂ RA×B → co{g(a, b)} is a linear
mapping, so its inverse g−1 is piecewise linear thus Lipschitz, see e.g., Billera & Sturm-
fels [8], bottom of page 530, or Walkup & Wets [81]. As a consequence, there exists λ > 0
such that for every z, z′ ∈ co{g(a, b)} and any points θ such that g(θ) = z, there exists
θ′ such that g(θ′) = z′ and ‖θ − θ′‖ ≤ λ‖z − z′‖. In particular, for every θ ∈ ∆(A× B),
if z ∈ ΠE (g(θ)) there exists θ such that g(θ) = z, thus θ ∈ E˜ and
dE˜(θ) ≤
∥∥∥θ − θ∥∥∥ ≤ λ∥∥∥g(θ)− g(θ)∥∥∥ = λ∥∥∥g(θ)−ΠE (g(θ))∥∥∥ = λdE(g(θ)) ,
and one just has to take γ = 1/λ. 
The consequence of this lemma is that an approachability strategy for E˜ is an ap-
proachability strategy for E (and reciprocally); apart from the requirement to compute
E˜ , only constants in rates of convergence deteriorate.
The main advantage of this new kind of algorithms is that they do not rely on the
observed sequences of payoffs. For example, consider the cases where payoffs are not
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vectors in some Euclidian space but in some arbitrarily normed space (or even payoffs
can be subsets of this space). If the image space is not Hilbertian, then Blackwell’s
proofs do no longer hold; on the other hand, the transformation sequences of payoff into
sequences of profile of action remains true. Therefore, we get this very general version
of characterization of approachable convex sets.
Theorem 1.7 Let
(
H,N (·)
)
be any normed space (not necessarily Hilbertian) and g :
∆(A)×∆(B) → H (or g : A× B → H is A and B are some compact convex sets) any
continuous bi-linear mapping. Then Blackwell’s characterization of approachable convex
sets holds:
A convex set C ⊂ H is approachable if and only if ∀y ∈ ∆(B),∃x ∈ ∆(A), g(x, y) ∈ C.
The result is already proved if A and B are finite. If they are some compact convex
sets and g is continuous, then one can discretize them to get ε-approachability strategy.
Since C is convex, they can be concatenate into an approachability strategy (using the
doubling trick).
From the point of view of computational geometry, this result is rather intuitive.
Indeed, no matter the image space, co
{
g(a, b); a ∈ A, b ∈ B} is a polytope with at most
AB vertices which belongs to a relative space of finite dimension at most AB − 1. Up
to a renormalization, this gives Theorem 1.7. However, in case where H = L2(Ω, µ,F),
this does not directly imply previous results as the approachability is only in probability
and not µ-almost surely.
1.4.3 Potential-based and uniform-norm approachability
Approachability was first defined with respect to the ℓ2 distance. Roughly speaking, this
induce a repeated game (see also the next subsection) between the player and Nature
where the first player minimizes the distance to the set E and Nature maximizes it.
This can be generalized to a more general class of mappings Φ : Rd → R, called po-
tentials, that are twice continuously differentiable (although this condition can be fairly
weakened).
An illustration of the interest of potential based approachability is given in the fol-
lowing Corollary 1.16. It yields fastest rates of convergence when distances to sets are
defined with respect to the uniform norm ‖ · ‖∞ instead of the Euclidian norm ‖.‖2.
Let us denote by δ the minimum level of Φ that player can guarantee in expectation
if he plays second, i.e.
δ = inf
{
λ ∈ R s.t. ∀y ∈ ∆(B),∃x ∈ ∆(A),Φ(g(x, y)) ≤ λ} and Eδ := Φ−1((−∞, δ]).
Theorem 1.8 Assume that, for every z outside Eδ, the gradient ∇Φ(z) points suffi-
ciently towards z, i.e., there exists β > 0 such
∀z 6∈ Eδ, ∃x := x(z) ∈ ∆(A) s.t. 〈∇Φ(z), g(x, y)−z〉 ≤ −β(Φ(z)− δ), ∀y ∈ ∆(B). (12)
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Then, no matter the strategy of Nature, choosing xn+1 = x(gn) yields, in expectation,
Φ(gn)− δ ≤
κΦ
(β − 1)
1
n
if β > 1 and Φ(gn)− δ ≤ κΦ
log(n) + 1
nβ
if 0 < β ≤ 1,
where κΦ is a constant depending uniquely on Φ.
If β = 0 but the inequality is strict in (12), then uniform convergence still holds yet
at a non-explicit rate.
Proof: First, notice that we can focus on the case where δ = 0. The proof follows from
Hart & Mas-Colell [32] and Sorin [71] (see also Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi [13, 14]) and is
based on a Taylor expansion of Φ. Indeed, since gn+1 = gn + (gn+1 − gn)/(n+1) and Φ
is C2, there exists some ξn ∈ [gn+1, gn] such that
Φ(gn+1) = Φ(gn)+
1
n + 1
〈∇Φ(gn), gn+1 − gn〉+
1
2(n + 1)2
(gn+1−gn)′D2Φ(ξn)(gn+1−gn)
where ∇Φ and D2Φ are respectively the gradient and the Hessian of Φ; since the latter
is C2 and every gn belongs to the same compact set, there exists κΦ such that (gn+1 −
gn)
′D2Φ(ξn)(gn+1 − gn) ≤ 2κΦ, for every n ∈ N. As a consequence, one has
E
[
Φ(gn+1)
]
≤
(
1− β
n+ 1
)
E
[
Φ(gn)
]
+
κΦ
(n+ 1)2
and the result follows from simple induction when β ≥ 1. When 0 < β < 1, the bound
is a consequence of the fact that(
1− β
n+ 1
)
log(n) + 1
nβ
+
1
(n + 1)2
≤ log(n+ 1) + 1
(n+ 1)β
.
The proof is a bit more intricate for β = 0 (along with a strict inequality in (12)), but
we can use the fact that gn is a D.S.A. of the following differential inclusion
g˙ ∈ AΦ(g) − g with AΦ(z) =
{
ω ∈ Rd; ‖ω‖ ≤ ‖g‖∞ and 〈∇Φ(z), ω − z〉 > 0
}
.
The mapping t 7→ Φ(g(t)) is a Lyapounov function since if g(t) 6∈ Cδ
d
dt
Φ(g(t)) = 〈∇Φ(g(t)), g˙(t)〉 ∈ 〈∇Φ(g(t)), AΦ(g(t)) − g(t)〉 < 0,
therefore g converges to Cδ and so does gn. 
If C and Φ are convex, then Equation (12) always holds with β = 1, and we recover
Theorem 7.6 of Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi [14] (due to Hart & Mas-Colell [32]):
Corollary 1.13 If C = Φ−1((−∞, 0]) for some convex, twice continuously differentiable
mapping Φ whose Hessian is bounded in norm by κΦ on co
{
g(a, b)
}
, there exists a strat-
egy such that, in expectation and no matter the strategy of Nature, Φ(gn) ≤ 2κΦ(log(n)+1)n .
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The assumption that Φ is twice continuously differentiable can be easily weakened,
in particular as soon as the constant κΦ exists. The next proposition is concerned with
the sequence of sums of payoffs Gn =
∑n
m=1 gm instead of averages. It will be used, in
some cases, to improve rates of convergence.
Proposition 1.14 Assume that
∀z 6∈ Eδ, ∃x := x(z) ∈ ∆(A) s.t. 〈∇Φ(z), g(x, y)〉 ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ ∆(B)
and there exists κΦ > 0 such that g(x, y)
′D2Φ(z)g(x, y) ≤ κΦ for every x ∈ ∆(A),
y ∈ ∆(B) and z 6∈ Eδ. Then, no matter Nature’s strategy, choosing xn+1 = x(Gn) yields
E
[
Φ(Gn)
] ≤ nκΦ +Φ(0).
Proof: This is a consequence of the fact that, for some ξn ∈ [Gn, Gn+1],
Φ(Gn+1) = Φ(Gn) + 〈∇Φ(Gn), gn+1〉+ g′n+1D2Φ(ξn)gn+1
followed by an immediate induction. 
This result can be immediately extended if Φ is not C2 but such that
Φ(Gn+1)− (Φ(Gn) + 〈∇Φ(Gn), gn+1〉) ≤ κΦ.
As mentioned before, the following corollary shows a faster convergence if C is an ap-
proachable cone. Proposition 1.14 is even used more deeply to get optimal rates of
convergence (both in the number of stages and the dimension) below to obtain ap-
proachability with respect to the uniform norm.
Corollary 1.15 If C is an approachable closed and convex cone, then Blackwell’s strategy
ensures that, no matter Nature’s strategy and for every N ∈ N
Eσ,τ [dC(gn)] ≤
‖g‖∞√
n
.
Proof: First, if C is a cone then necessarily 〈z − ΠC(z),ΠC(z)〉 ≤ 0, therefore the first
condition of Proposition 1.14 is the characterization of the fact that C is a B-set. Second,
if Φ(·) = d2C(·) then Φ satisfies the second condition of Proposition 1.14 – or at least its
straightforward extension – with κΦ = ‖g‖2∞.
Since C is a cone, d2C(gn) = Φ(Gn+1)/n2 and the result follows. 
For simplicity, we will assume that ‖g(a, b)‖∞ ≤ 1 and we only consider target sets
such that, for some bk, ck ≤ 1,
C :=
{
z ∈ Rd s.t. bk ≤ zk ≤ ck,∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d}
}
.
The ℓ∞-distance to this set is denoted by d∞C , i.e. d
∞
C (z) = infc∈C ‖z − c‖∞.
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Corollary 1.16 There exists a strategy σ of the player such that, against any strategy
τ of Nature and every n ∈ N and δ > 0, with probability at least 1− δ,
Eσ,τ
[
d∞C (gn)
]
≤ 14
√
log(2d)
n
and Pσ,τ
{
d∞C (gn) ≥ δ
}
≤ 16
√
log
(
2d
δ
)
n
.
Proof: We first prove a similar result in the specific case where C = Rd− is the negative
orthant and if an horizon N is known in advance. Then we will use a doubling trick
to conclude for the orthant; we will finally show how to reduce approachability of any
product set C.
Let Φ be the following potential, depending on a parameter η > 0 to be fixed later:
Φ(z) :=
1
η
log
[
d∑
k=1
eηzk
]
so that d∞C (z) ≤ Φ(z) and Φ(0) ≤ log(d) ; moreover
∇Φ(z)i = e
ηzi∑d
k=1 e
ηzk
and D2Φ(z) = η diag
(
eηzi∑d
k=1 e
ηzk
)
− η∇Φ(z)∇Φ(z)′,
where diag(λi) is the matrix whose diagonal is λ1, . . . , λd and zero everywhere. As a
consequence, since C is approachable, the first condition of Proposition 1.14 is satisfied
and ω′D2Φ(z)ω ≤ ηω′ diag(λi)ω − η‖∇Φ(z)ω‖22 ≤ η‖ω‖2∞ implies the second one.
So, convexity of d∞C (·), Proposition 1.14 and the choice η =
√
log(d)/N imply that
Eσ,τ
[
d∞C (gN )
]
≤ Eσ,τ
[d∞C (GN )
N
]
≤ 1
N
E[Φ(GN )] ≤ η + log(d)
ηN
= 2
√
log(d)
N
.
We now make appeal to the doubling trick, that is, we consider the strategy con-
sisting in playing by blocks of lengths 2k, following the potential associated with ηk :=√
log(d)/2k on the k-th block and reseting everything at the beginning of a new block.
A simple induction, based on the convexity of d∞C (·), shows that, at the end of any block,
Eσ,τ
[
d∞C (g2k−1)
]
≤ 2(1 +
√
2)
√
log(d)
2k − 1 .
Hence it remains to control distances within blocks. Yet, using the previous bound
obtained for ends of blocks, one has for n = 2k − 1 +m with m ≤ 2k,
Eσ,τ [d
∞
C (gn)] ≤
2k − 1
n
Eσ,τ
[
d∞C (g2k−1)
]
+
m
n
(
ηk +
log(d)
ηkm
)
≤
√
log(d)
n
[
2(1 +
√
2)
√
2k − 1 + m√
2k
+
√
2k
]
≤ (4 + 2
√
2)
√
log(d)
n
.
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Concentration arguments give the bound in high probability. Indeed, the union bound
implies
P
{
∃k ≤ d s.t. ∣∣gkn − E[gkn]∣∣ ≥ ε} ≤ 2d exp (−nε2 ) ,
thus the probability that ‖gn−E[gn]‖∞ is smaller than
√
2
n log
(
2d
δ
)
is bigger than 1− δ.
The result for the orthant is a direct consequence of the triangle inequality.
We no longer assume that C is an orthant, but is defined by
C :=
{
z ∈ Rd s.t. bk ≤ zk ≤ ck,∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d}
}
.
Let h(x, y) =
(
gk(x, y)−ck, bk−gk(x, y)
)
k∈{1,...,d
∈ R2d, then approachability of gn to C is
equivalent to the approachability of hn to the negative orthant, since d
∞
C (gn) = d
∞
R2d
−
(gn)
and g(x, y) ∈ C if and only if h(x, y) ∈ R2d− . The result follows from the bound exhibited
for the orthant.

1.4.4 From weak approachability to approachability
Recall that a closed set E is approachable if the player has a strategy such that after
some (maybe large) stage N , the payoffs remains in a small neighborhood of E . Similarly,
it is excludable if Nature can enforce the dual: after some stage N , the payoffs remains
outside some neighborhood of E . Blackwell proved that there exists a dichotomy for
convex sets: they are either approachable or excludable. This is not true for any set, as
illustrated in the following example, due to Blackwell.
Consider the set and payoff matrix defined by, with A = {T,B} and B = {L,R},
E =
{
(1/2, y), y ∈ [0, 1/4]
}
∪
{
(1, y), y ∈ [1/4, 1]
}
and
L R
T (1, 0) (1, 1)
B (0, 0) (0, 0)
.
Assume that the strategy of the player dictates to play T during N stages (with N a
large even number) then to play either always T or always B during the following N
stages, depending on wether Nature has played more than half of the time R during the
first N stages.
In the former case, the player got after N stages, an average payoff of (1, y) with
y ≥ 1/2 thus by keeping to play T for N stages, he ensures that its average payoff after
2N stages is (1, y′) with y′ ≥ y/2 ≥ 1/4. In the latter case, the payoff after N stages is
(1, y) with y ≤ 1/2, thus the payoff after 2N stages is (1/2, y′) with y′ = y/2 ≤ 1/4.
As a consequence, this strategy guarantees that, after 2N stages, the payoff is exactly
in E . So if this procedure is applied during 2N1 stages, then started over for 2N2 = 2eN1
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stages, then started again over for 2N3 = 2e
N2 stages and so on, the payoff is infinitely
often arbitrarily closed to E which is therefore not excludable.
Unfortunately, E is not approachable; indeed, this would imply that at least one of
the two connected (and convex) component of E is approachable. But neither of them
satisfies Blackwell’s characterization.
In this example, the player cannot enforce the payoff to remain close to E , but if he
knows in advance that there are only N stages in the game, then he can ensure that, at
the terminal stage, the payoff is in E (or at least, for odd integer, 1/N -close to E). A
natural weaker concept of approachability emerges: a set E ⊂ Rd is weakly-approachable
if, given some fixed large length of the game, the player has a strategy such that the
terminal average payoff is close to E .
Definition 1.6 A closed set E ⊂ Rd is weakly approachable if for every ε > 0, there
exists Nε ∈ N such that, in any game of length n ≥ N , the player has a strategy σn such
that, no matter the strategy τ of Nature, Eσn,τ
[
dE(gn)
]
≤ ε.
Similarly, E is weakly excludable if Nature can weakly approach the complement of
Eδ for some δ > 0.
We emphasize the fact that in weak-approachability, strategies can depend on the length
of the game n, which is not allowed for regular approachability. The question rose
by Blackwell [9] and solved by Vieille [77] is wether there exists a dichotomy between
weakly-approachable and weakly-excludable sets.
Theorem 1.9 Any closed set is either weakly-approachable or weakly-approachable.
Proof: We only sketch here the proof of Vieille[77].
Consider the differential zero-sum game where the player and Nature choose ac-
tion x(t) ∈ ∆(A) and y(t) ∈ ∆(B) in continuous time (actually, even the formal def-
inition of strategies might require precise notations and concepts). In this game, a
state variable which represents the accumulated payoff, evolves following the dynamic
G˙(t) = g
(
x(t), y(t)
)
and G(0) = 0 during the time t = 0 and t = 1.
In this game, the overall objective of the player is to minimize the terminal payoff
dE (G(1)), while Nature maximizes it. The important fact is that one can prove, using
techniques and results from differential games, that this game has a value v. If v = 0,
then the player has a strategy such that the cumulated payoff at time t = 1 is exactly
in E whereas if v > 0, Nature has a strategy such that this cumulated payoff is bounded
away from E .
It remains to understand that a game in discrete time with N stages is a discretization
(or an approximation) of this differential game and as N goes to infinity, this approxi-
mation is more and more precise. Therefore, if the player can enforce that G(1) belongs
to E , then he can ensure that gN is arbitrarily close to E when N is large enough. The
converse holds for Nature, hence the result. 
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Actually, the focus of this section if not only this important (and elegant) result
but also the following properties, inspired from Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi [14] or Rakhlin,
Sridharan & Tewari [66]. Given an approachable convex set C, let σN be an optimal
strategy in the N -stage zero-sum game with terminal payoff Eσ,τ
[
dC(gN )
]
and denote
by vN the value of this game (its existence is not difficult).
We know that Eσ,τ
[
dC(gn)
]
can be upper bounded, using some adequate approach-
ability strategy, by O (‖g‖∞/
√
n); but it is also obviously lower-bounded by vn. So the
computation of vn could indicate wether the rate is tight or not. On the other hand,
exact computation of vn might be challenging, yet if satisfies
vn = min
σn
max
τ
Eσ,τ
[
dC(gn)
]
= max
τ
min
σn
Eσ,τ
[
dC(gn)
]
≤ max
τ
min
σ(τ)
Eσ,τ
[
dC(gn)
]
where σ(τ) is the strategy that chooses, given τ and after the finite history hn, xn+1 =
x(τ(hn)). In particular, Eτ,σ(τ)[ĝn] :=
∑n
m=1Eτ,σ(τ)[gm|hm−1]/n belongs to C and there-
fore (removing the dependency in σ)
vn ≤ max
τ
E
[
‖gn − Eτ [gn]‖
]
≤ sup
g˜
E
[∥∥∥∥∑nm=1 g˜m − E[g˜m|hm−1]n
∥∥∥∥] ≤ O(‖g‖∞√n
)
where the supremum is taken over all sequences g˜m−E[g˜m|hm−1] of martingale differences
with g˜m ∈ {g(a, b), a ∈ A, b ∈ B}. Last inequality is a consequence of Hoeffding-Azuma’s
inequality in Euclidian spaces.
A question that naturally arises is wether we can concatenate – using the doubling
trick – optimal strategies in games of length 2k to construct an approachability strategy
of C (i.e., independent of any horizon n). The answer is both no and yes: no with the
current definition of vn. Indeed the only guarantee is that terminal payoff is v2k -close to
C but, for instance, payoff at middle stages could be arbitrarily away.
On the other hand, since C is a convex set, we can modify the definition of vn as
follows so that the answer is yes. Define
v′n = maxτ minσn
Eσ,τ
[
sup
m≤n
m
n
dC(gm)
]
≤ max
τ
min
σ(τ)
Eσ,τ
[
sup
m≤n
m
n
dC(gm)
]
,
so that, using the same arguments and Doobs (or Hoeffding) maximal inequality
v′n ≤ maxτ E
[
sup
m≤n
m
n
‖gn − Eτ [gn]‖
]
≤ sup
g˜
E
[
1
n
∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
s=1
g˜s −E[g˜s|hs−1]
∥∥∥∥∥
]
≤ O
(‖g‖∞√
n
)
.
Finally, the doubling trick works with this definition of v′n, see the proof of Corollary 1.16.
This technique seems void at first sight, but might be useful in some specific examples,
as in Proposition 4.2 in Section 4 (see also Remark 4.2). In this case, because of the
geometry of C, one has dC(z) ≤ 2‖z−c‖∞, for every c ∈ C. Then the same tools yield that
vn is smaller than O
(√
log(d)/n
)
which is negligible compared to ‖g‖∞/
√
n ≃ √d/n
as the dimension d increases.
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2 Regret minimization
Hannan [30] introduced the concept of external regret in repeated two-player games (be-
tween a player and Nature, with scalar payoff) in order to define an exogenous criterium
to evaluate a strategy in a non-Bayesian framework. In words, the player has no ex-
ternal regret (or his strategy is externally consistent) if, asymptotically, he could not
have gained strictly more if he had known, before the beginning of the game, the em-
pirical distribution of moves of Nature. This notion has notably been refined by Foster
& Vohra [23] (see also Fudenberg & Levine [28]) into internal regret: a player has no
internal regret (or his strategy is internally consistent) if he has no external regret on
the set of stages where he played a specific action, as soon as this set is big enough.
2.1 Finite action spaces
Consider a two-person repeated game where action spaces of the player and Nature are
A and B (of cardinalities A and B) and ρ : A × B → [0, 1] is a real payoff mapping.
Extension of ρ to ∆(A)×∆(B) and strategies are defined as in the previous section.
2.1.1 External regret
Choices of actions an ∈ A and bn ∈ B generate a regret rn ∈ RA defined by
rn = r(an, bn) :=
(
ρ(1, bn)− ρ(an, bn), . . . , ρ(A, bn)− ρ(an, bn)
)
∈ RA.
Intuitively, the regret rn represents the differences between what the player could have
got and what he actually got. And a player has no external regret if, asymptotically,
every component of the average regret is non positive. In words, this means that the
player could not think " if I had known [the empirical distribution of Nature’s actions],
I would have always played action a∗", hence the terminology of regret. Indeed, by
linearity of ρ,
rn =
(
ρ(1, bn)− ρn, . . . , ρ(A, bn)− ρn
)
∈ RA.
Given a vector U ∈ Rd, the notation U+ will stand for the positive part of U , i.e.,
U+ =
(
max{U i, 0})
1≤i≤d. Similarly, U
− is the negative part of U .
Definition 2.1 A strategy σ of the player has no external regret if, for all strategy τ of
Nature, Pσ,τ -almost surely,
lim sup
n→∞
max
a∗∈A
ρ(a∗, bn)− ρn ≤ 0, or equivalently, lim sup
n→∞
‖r+n ‖∞ ≤ 0. (13)
The existence of externally consistent strategies goes back to Hannan [30]. However, the
following theorem, with rates of convergence independent of Nature’s strategy, is due to
Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi [14].
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Theorem 2.1 There exists an externally consistent strategy σ, such that, no matter the
strategy τ of Nature and for every n ∈ N,
Eσ,τ
[
max
a∗∈A
ρ(a∗, bn)− ρn
]
= Eσ,τ
[
‖r+n ‖∞
]
≤ 2
√
log(A)
n
.
We will not yet provide proofs of this result; instead, we will show a weaker result,
following Zinkevich [83]. The basic idea is to notice that the overall objective is to
maximize the convex function ρ(·, bn) and therefore to apply any convex-maximization
techniques, for example a gradient descent.
Proof: First, we claim that for every n ∈ N, there exists a strategy σn (that depends
on n), such that
Eσ,τ
[
max
a∗∈A
ρ(a∗, bn)− ρn
]
≤
√
A
n
.
Let η be a parameter to be fixed later and define, for every m ≤ n the strategy σ
following an usual gradient descend:
x′m+1 = xm + ηρ(·, bm) and xm+1 = Π∆(A)
(
x′m+1
)
, with x1 = x
′
1 =
(
1
A
, . . . ,
1
A
)
,
the projection step ensures that xm+1 stays in ∆(A). Simple calculations show that, for
every a ∈ A,
Eσ,τ
[
n∑
m=1
ρ(a, bm)− ρm
]
= Eσ,τ
[
n∑
m=1
(a− xm)′ρ(·, bm)
]
=
n∑
m=1
(a− xm)′
(x′m+1 − xm)
η
=
1
2η
n∑
m=1
‖a− xm‖2 + ‖xm − x′m+1‖2 − ‖a− x′m+1‖2
≤ 1
2η
n∑
m=1
‖a− x′m‖2 + ‖xm − x′m+1‖2 − ‖a− x′m+1‖2
=
1
2η
‖a− x1‖2 + 1
2η
n∑
m=1
η2‖ρ(·, bm)‖2 ≤ 1
2η
+
ηnA
2
.
Balancing the two terms by choosing η = 1/
√
nA proves the claim. We stress out the
fact that this strategy ensures that, at stage t, the regret is bounded as
Eσ,τ
[
t∑
m=1
ρ(a, bm)− ρm
]
≤
√
nA
2
+
t
√
A
2
√
n
,
which might be considerably bigger than
√
tA for small t, but this uniform guarantee
allows the use of a doubling trick, as in Corollary 1.16, to conclude. 
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To get the log(A) term instead of A in the upper bound, one just has to follow the
algorithm known as exponential weight algorithm, defined by:
xn+1[a] =
exp
(
ηnρ(a, bn)
)∑
a′∈A exp
(
ηnρ(a′, bn)
) where ηn =√8n log(A) ,
see, e.g., Littlestone & Warmuth [47], Vovk [79] or Auer, Cesa-Bianchi & Gentile [3].
The following corollary shows that the previous result can be extended to the compact
case. Actually, the proof is exactly the same, since it did not use the fact that B is finite,
thus is omitted.
Corollary 2.1 Assume that Nature chooses at every stage an outcome vector Un in a
compact set U ⊂ [0; 1]A such that the players payoff at this stage is Uann . Then there
exists a strategy σ, such that, no matter the strategy τ of Nature and for every n ∈ N,
Eσ,τ
[
max
a∗∈A
Ua
∗
n − Uann
]
≤ 2
√
log(A)
n
.
Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.1 can actually be proved using more complex optimiza-
tion procedures, as mirror descent instead of gradient descent (see e.g., Rakhlin [64] or
Bubeck [12] for a survey on the use of these techniques in machine learning) and without
using doubling trick. We will, on the contrary, prove them using approachability theory.
Remark 2.1 In Section 1.4.4, we claimed that we could not use a doubling trick. It was
possible here because any strategy σn, although only optimal at the final stage n, ensures
relatively good performance at all stages. For instance, at the specific stage t = n/2,
the regret is bounded in 3
√
2
4
√
A/t ≃ 1.06√A/t. This was not the case in the previous
section, where the distance to the set could be of the order of a constant.
More specifically, strategies σn are somehow equivalent to weak approachability (only
the final stage matters). If we could always concatenate strategies using a doubling trick to
output a strategy that behaves well at all stages, then we could construct approachability
strategy from weak approachability strategies. This would mean that any set is either
approachable or excludable, which is not true in general (in fact, as proved in Section 4.1,
regret corresponds more to the approachability of convex sets, on which weak and regular
approachability coincide).
An usual criticism to the notion of regret in games (and this could lead to long
and probably unfruitful debates) is that a player compares his payoff with the payoff he
would have got if he had always played the pure action a∗. However, if he had played
something else, then Nature would (or at least could) have chosen a totally different
sequence bn so the comparison is meaningless. An easy and unsatisfactory answer is to
say that a player’s action does not change the behavior of Nature (as in the learning with
experts advices literature, see Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi [14]). A less unsatisfactory answer
consists in stating that since there is absolutely no prior on Nature, it is impossible to
infer whatsoever on her strategy if the world had been different. So we should compare
the payoff with respect to best information available, which is the current sequence.
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Let us develop a third point of view, based on game theoretic perspectives. The basic
idea is that regret is not a criterion to compare different strategies: it does not say that
a strategy without regret is a better strategy than always playing a∗. In our repeated
game, the player maximizes his cumulated payoff without any structural assumption on
Nature. Therefore, he can just sequentially formulate predictions upon her behavior (we
purposely remain vague on this subject) and play a best response to it. Regret is a
simple measure on how much a sequence of predictions is correct or not. A large regret
would mean that the player was most of the time wrong.
2.1.2 Internal and Φ-regret
The notion of external regret has been refined by Foster & Vohra [23] into the so-called
internal regret. In words, a player has no internal regret (or his strategy is internally
consistent) if he has no external regret on the set of stages on which he chose a specific
given action.
Formally, choices of action an ∈ A and bn ∈ B generate, besides an external regret
rn, an internal regret Rn which is an A×A-matrix whose raw are null except the an-th
one which is r′n; stated otherwise
Ra,a
′
n = R(an, bn)
a,a′ :=
{
ρ(a′, bn)− ρ(an, bn) if a = an
0 otherwise
.
Let us introduce here some notations. Given two sequences gn ∈ Rd and an ∈ A, recall
that gn denote the average up to stage n. We define, for every a ∈ A, the following
subset of stages and conditional averages
Nn[a] :=
{
m ∈ {1, . . . , n} s.t. am = a
}
and gn[a] =
∑
m∈Nn[a] gm
|Nn[a]| .
Definition 2.2 A strategy σ is internally consistent if, no matter the strategy τ of Na-
ture, Pσ,τ -almost surely,
lim sup
n→∞
‖R+n ‖∞ ≤ 0 or equivalently lim sup
n→∞
max
a∈A
|Nn[a]|
n
(
max
a∗∈A
ρ
(
a∗, bn[a]
)− ρn[a]) ≤ 0.
It is compulsory to multiply the regret accumulated onNn[a] by the frequency of action a,
namely |Nn[a]|/n. Otherwise internally consistent strategies would not exist. However,
another possible formulation (see Lehre & Solan [45]) is to require that
lim sup
n→∞
max
a∗∈A
ρ
(
a∗, bn[a]
)− ρn[a] ≤ 0, for every action a ∈ A s.t. limn→∞ |Nn[a]| =∞,
but, unfortunately, this definition does not allow to measure internal regret at a given
finite stage n.
Existence part of the following theorem is first due to Foster & Vohra [23]; rates of
convergence (constant are not optimal, see e.g. Stoltz & Lugosi [75]) can be inferred
from rates of external regret, as showed in Section 2.1.3 where proof is postponed.
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Theorem 2.2 There exist internally consistent strategies such that, for every n ∈ N
Eσ,τ
[
max
a∈A
|Nn[a]|
n
(
max
a∗∈A
ρ
(
a∗, bn[a]
)− ρn[a])] = Eσ,τ[ ∥∥∥R+n ∥∥∥∞ ] ≤ 3
√
log(A)
n
.
Regret has been refined further by Blum & Mansour [11] into swap-regret (or Φ-
regret). Define, for every mapping φ : A → A, family Φ ⊂ {φ : A → A} and n ∈ N,
Rφn =
1
n
n∑
m=1
ρ(φ(am), bm)− ρ(am, bm) and RΦn =
(
Rφn
)
φ∈Φ
∈ R|Φ|.
Definition 2.3 A strategy σ has no Φ-regret if, no matter the strategy τ of Nature,
Pσ,τ -almost surely,
lim sup
n→∞
∥∥∥RΦ+n ∥∥∥∞ ≤ 0 or equivalently lim supn→∞ maxφ∈Φ
∑n
m=1 ρ(φ(am), bm)
n
− ρn ≤ 0.
Existence of such strategies is due to Blum & Mansour [11]; proofs are again delayed.
Theorem 2.3 There exists strategies without Φ-regret such that, for every n ∈ N
Eσ,τ
[
max
φ∈Φ
∑n
m=1 ρ(φ(am), bm)
n
− ρn
]
= Eσ,τ
[ ∥∥∥RΦ+n ∥∥∥∞ ] ≤ 3
√
log(|Φ|)
n
.
The notion of Φ-regret is a refinement of respectively external and internal regret,
because of the specific choices of families Φe :=
{
φa∗ ;∀a∗ ∈ A, φa∗(a) = a∗,∀a ∈ A
}
or
Φi :=
{
φa′,a∗ ; ∀a′, a∗ ∈ A, φa′,a∗(a′) = a∗ and φa′,a∗(a) = a if a 6= a′
}
. Proposition 2.2
links the different aforementioned quantities, and shows that minimizing internal regret
is, in some sense, enough to minimize each one of them (up to the cost of a factor A).
We will need the following notation.
Given a family Φ ⊂ {φ : A → A}, we define the matrix HΦ of size |Φ| ×A2 by
H
φ,(a,a′)
Φ = 1 if φ(a) = a
′ and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 2.2 Given any family Φ ⊂ {φ : A → A}, one has RΦn = HΦRn where Rn
is seen as a vector of size A2. As a consequence,
∥∥∥RΦ+n ∥∥∥∞ ≤ A∥∥∥R+n ∥∥∥∞.
For the specific case of external regret, one also has rn = Rn1 (where Rn is seen
as a matrix and 1 is a vector with only ones). The converse is not true as there exist
externally consistent strategies with linear internal regret.
Proof: The proof of the first part follows directly from the definitions of internal and
Φ-regret. For the existence of externally consistent strategies with linear internal regret,
we refer to Stoltz & Lugosi [75]. 
Another refinements of these concepts can be made, following this time Fudenberg
& Levine [28] and Lehrer [43], in two different directions. The first one is to assume
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that regret is computed not at every stages, but only on a restricted subset of stages
(that might depend on the history) and the second direction is to consider time varying
switch-mapping φ. Formally, let X be an activation function, i.e., X : H × A → {0, 1}
and X (hn, an+1) = 1 indicated that the stage n + 1 is active. We recall that H stands
for the set of all finite histories.. A switch function φ : H ×A → A indicates that, after
the finite history hn, ρ(an+1, bn+1) will be compared to ρ(φ(h
n, an+1), bn+1).
Definition 2.4 Given an activation mapping X and a switch mapping φ, a strategy σ
has no (X , φ)-regret if, no matter the strategy τ of Nature, Pσ,τ -almost surely
lim sup
n→∞
∑n
m=1 X (hm−1, am)
[
ρ(φ(hm−1, am), bm)− ρm
]∑n
m=1 X (hm−1, am)
≤ 0,
as soon as
∑n
m=1 X (hm−1, am) converges to +∞.
Lehrer [43] has proved that, given a probability λ on the whole set of pairs of activations-
switch mappings (embedded with the product topology), there exists a strategy without
(X , φ)-regret, for λ-almost all pairs. However, rates of convergence are not explicit, in
part because we divide the score by the number of actives stages
∑n
m=1 X (hm−1, am)
and not by n.
2.1.3 Reductions : form external to Φ-regret
In this section, we show how to construct a strategy with no Φ-regret based on an
algorithm that only outputs externally consistent strategies, developing an idea of Stoltz
& Lugosi [75] and recovering the more general result of Blum & Mansour [11]. Indeed,
consider the following auxiliary game where action sets of the player and Nature are
respectively Φ and a compact subset U ⊂ [0; 1]A. Given an exogenous sequences pn ∈
∆(A) we define the payoff at stage n of the player generated by the choices of φ ∈ Φ
and Un ∈ U by
V φn =
∑
a∈A
pn[a]U
φ(a)
n :=
∑
a∈A
pn ◦ φ−1[a]Uan .
Let θ be an externally consistent strategy and θφn denote the weight put by θ on φ at
stage n. Then the expected external regret at this stage is written as
rφ
′
n = V
φ′
n − E
[
V φnn
]
=
∑
a∈A
pn[a]U
φ′(a)
n −
∑
φ∈Φ
θφn
∑
a∈A
pn[a]U
φ(a)
n
=
∑
a∈A
pn[a]U
φ′(a)
n −
∑
a∈A
∑
φ∈Φ
θφnpn ◦ φ−1[a]
Uan
On the other hand, the strategy that dictates to play pn at stage n in the original
game suffers an expected Φ-regret defined by
E
[
Rφ
′
n
]
=
∑
a∈A
pn[a]U
φ′(a)
n −
∑
a∈A
pn[a]U
a
n .
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So, as soon as pn[a] =
∑
φ∈Φ θ
φ
npn ◦ φ−1[a] for every a ∈ A, Φ-regret in the original
game and external regret in the auxiliary game coincide exactly (in expectation). And
the latter converges to zero, at the same speed of the former, i.e., at rates indicated by
Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.1.
The existence of such a pn is a simple consequence of Brouwer fixed point theorem.
Indeed, first, notice that θn depends only on the past observations, thus is independent
of pn. As a consequence, pn can be taken as any fixed point of the continuous mapping
p 7→∑φ∈Φ θφnp ◦ φ−1 from the simplex ∆(A) to itself.
We only have proved the convergence of Φ-regret in expectation; as usual, almost sure
convergence is a consequence of concentration inequalities (or see Theorem 2.7, page 47
and Example 1, page 19, in Hall & Heyde [29]).
2.2 Compact action spaces, generalizations and examples
2.2.1 Compact action spaces
Although Φ-regret can be seen as a consequence of external or internal regret in the finite
case (when A is finite), its introduction is more useful in the following compact case.
Assume that A, action space of the player, is no longer finite but a compact subset
of some Euclidian space. On the other side, U , action space of Nature, is a subset of
mappings from A to R. Choices of an ∈ A and Un ∈ U generate, at stage n, a payoff of
ρn := Un(an).
External regret is defined almost exactly as before, i.e., rn : A → R is a continuous
mapping defined by rn(a) = Un(a)−ρn. In the compact case, we must however be careful
in the order of quantifiers when passing to limits: a strategy σ is externally consistent
if, for all strategy τ of Nature, Pσ,τ -almost surely,
sup
a∗∈A
lim sup
n→∞
Un(a
∗)− ρn ≤ 0, or equivalently,
∥∥∥∥lim sup
n→∞
r+n
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ 0.
Remark 2.2 We claimed that order of quantifiers has some importance. Assume that
A = [0, 1] and that for every n ∈ N and a ∈ [0; 1], Un(a) = 1a∈(0,1/n). Choosing always
the same fixed action a∗ gives zero as an asymptotic average payoff, therefore the strategy
that plays an = 0 should not have any regret (neither external, internal, or Φ for that
matter).
On the other hand, for every N ∈ N, the choice of a∗ = 1/2N gives UN (a∗) = 1,
thus lim supn→∞ supa∗∈A Un(a∗) − ρn = 1. This explains the choices in the order of
quantifiers in the definition.
Difficulties arise to define internal regret, because scores are multiplied by frequencies
of actions in the finite case. We shall instead only focus on Φ-regret, whose definition is
also identical: RΦn : Φ→ R is a mapping defined by RΦn (φ) = Un(φ(an))− Un(an). And
a strategy σ has no Φ-regret if, for all strategy τ of Nature, Pσ,τ -almost surely,
sup
φ∈Φ
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
Un(φ(an))− Un(an) ≤ 0, or equivalently,
∥∥∥∥lim sup
n→∞
RΦ
+
n
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ 0.
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If A is not compact but (A,F , µ) is a probability space, then external and Φ-regret
can also be defined µ-almost surely. The supremum over Φ is simply replaced by for
µ-almost every mappings φ ∈ Φ.
2.2.2 Generalizations
The whole concept of regret minimization can be extended beyond the comparison of
averages of scalar payoffs. Let g : A× B → Rd be a vector valued payoff mapping and
define a sequence of evaluation mapping Bn :
(
R
d
)n → R and a class Ξ of departure
sequence ξ[g] : A× B → Rd. Then a strategy σ has no generalized regret if
sup
ξ∈Ξ
lim sup
n→∞
Bn
(
ξ[g](a1, b1), . . . , ξ[g](an, bn)
)
−Bn
(
g(a1, b1), . . . , g(an, bn)
)
≤ 0 .
almost surely, no matter the strategy of Nature.
Of course, without additional assumptions on the sequences Bn and Φ, generalized
regret cannot be minimized. Rakhlin, Sridharan & Tewari [66] have used the min-max
techniques to infer the existence of such strategies (associated with rates of convergences)
on specific cases:
i) External, internal and Φ-regret are obtained if g = ρ, Bn(z1, . . . , Zn) =
1
n
∑n
m=1 zm
and, for every φ ∈ Φ, there exists ξ ∈ Ξ such that ξ[g](a, b) = ρ(φ(a), b).
ii) Approachability of a convex C if Bn(z1, . . . , zn) = −dC
(
1
n
∑n
m=1 zm
)
and the de-
parture mappings are ξ[g](a, b) ∈ C for any a ∈ A and b ∈ B.
iii) When B is a function of the average, i.e., Bn(z1, . . . , zn) = G
(
1
n
∑n
m=1 zm
)
, an in-
teresting (yet maybe counterintuitive) property arises even in the finite case. There
might exist strategies that are not externally consistent yet internally consistent,
in the sense that,
lim sup
n→∞
max
x∗∈∆(A)
G
(
ρ(x∗, bn)
)
−G
(
ρn
)
> 0
but for every a ∈ A
lim sup
n→∞
|Nn[a]|
n
(
sup
x∗∈∆(A)
G
(
ρ(x∗, bn
)
−G
(
ρn[a]
))
≤ 0 .
2.2.3 Experts
An interpretation – which is actually also a generalization – of these results concerns
games of predictions with expert advices, studied (almost exhaustively) by Cesa-Bianchi
& Lugosi [14]. At each stage n ∈ N, an agent must take a decision dn in some topological
convex and compact set D. He is advised by a pool E of experts, i.e., expert e suggests to
choose the decision den at this stage. Once his choice his made, Nature reveals the state of
the world sn ∈ S (where S is some arbitrary space) which generate a loss Ln := L(dn, sn).
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After n stages, the agent has suffered an average loss of Ln =
1
n
∑n
m=1 L(dm, sm)
while the best expert had incurred an average loss of L
⋆
n =
1
n mine∈E
∑n
m=1 L(d
a
m, sm).
An evaluation criteria of a strategy of an agent compare these two quantities, as was
done by Auer, Cesa-Bianchi & Gentile [3].
Corollary 2.3 If L is convex and has value in [0; 1], then there exists an algorithm such
that
Ln − L⋆n ≤ 2
√
log(|E|)
n
.
Proof: Consider an externally consistent strategy σ given by Theorem 2.1, where the
action set is the set of experts and the payoff at stage n of choosing expert e is ρ(e, sn) =
−L (den, sn). Denote by xn+1 ∈ ∆(E) the mixed action dictates by σ at stage n + 1. It
induces the decision dn+1 =
∑
e∈E xn+1[e]d
e
n+1 which satisfies, by convexity of L:
L(dn+1, sn+1) ≤
∑
e∈E
xn+1[e]L(d
e
n+1, sn+1) = Eσ,sn+1 [ρ(e, sn+1)] .
Therefore Ln − L⋆n is smaller than the expected regret of σ, hence the result. 
2.3 Links with game theory
2.3.1 Regret and sets of equilibria
Existence of consistent strategies can be used to prove classical game theory results: non-
emptiness of Hannan (or correlated) sets and min-max theorems, as noticed by Blum &
Mansour [11] and Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi [14].
Consider a game between a set of players I of size I, where Ai denotes the finite
action space of player i and ρi :
∏
i∈I Ai → R his payoff function (extended multi-linearly
as usual). Hannan set of player i is the subset of joint distributions of actions defined by
Hi =
{
q ∈ ∆
(∏
i∈I
Ai
)
; ρi
(
a, q−i
) ≤ ρi(q),∀a ∈ Ai
}
=
{
q ∈ ∆
(∏
i∈I
Ai
)
; max
a∗∈Ai
ρi
(
a∗, q−i
)− ρi(q) ≤ 0
}
,
where ρi(q) = Eq[ρi] and q−n is the marginal of q on
∏
j 6=iAj, i.e., the empirical joint
distribution of actions played by the opponents of player i. Informally, a joint distribution
q belongs to Hi if player i has no interest to always play a fixed action a∗ ∈ Ai if his
opponents coordinate to play accordingly to q−i.
By linearity of ρi, if a strategy of player i is externally consistent (independently
of the behavior of its opponents), then necessarily the empirical joint distribution of
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actions converges to Hi. We qualify this property as unilateral, as it does not make any
assumption on opponents’ strategies.
If every player follows unilaterally an externally consistent strategy (but not necessary
output by the same algorithm), then empirical distributions of actions will converge to
the Hannan set of the game, H = ∩i∈IHi, which is therefore guaranteed to be non empty.
The main difference between elements of Hannan set and Nash equilibria is that in
the latter the distribution must be a product distribution. So set of Nash equilibria is
always contained, but might be in some arbitrary game, much smaller than H.
On the other hand, in zero sum game, elements of Hannan set satisfy the following
property. If q ∈ ∆(A×B) belongs to H, then if we denote by q1 ∈ ∆(A) and q2 ∈ ∆(B)
its marginals, necessarily
min
y∈∆(B)
max
x∈∆(A)
ρ(x, y) ≤ max
a∈A
ρ(a, q2) ≤ ρ(q) ≤ min
b∈B
ρ(q1, b) ≤ max
x∈∆(A)
min
y∈∆(B)
ρ(x, y) .
Since maxx∈∆(A)miny∈∆(B) ρ(x, y) ≤ miny∈∆(B)maxx∈∆(A) ρ(x, y) always holds, both
quantities must coincide and, by definition, are equal to the value v of the game. More
importantly, the first and last inequality above imply that
max
a∈A
ρ(a, q2) = max
x∈∆(A)
ρ(x, q2) = v and min
b∈B
ρ(q1, b) = min
y∈∆(B)
ρ(q1, y) = v,
thus (q1, q2) is a pair of optimal mixed actions.
As a consequence, in a zero sum game, if players follows unilaterally consistent strate-
gies, they will obtain asymptotically at least the value. And if both players have con-
sistent strategies, their empirical mixed action converges to their set of optimal mixed
actions.
This property has been somehow generalized by Hart and Mas-Colell [33] in potential
games, see also Viossat & Zapechelnyuk [78]. They have constructed a specific externally
consistent strategy such that, if both players follows it, the product of empirical distri-
butions of actions converges to the set of Nash equilibria (and more precisely to a subset
of it whose payoff are identical). However, this is only a global property (as opposed to
unilateral properties) as both players must follow this specific strategy. Moreover, the
result does not extend to any game, even those with an unique Nash equilibria.
We proved, following Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi [14] and Sorin [70], a min-max theorem
due to von Neumann using externally consistent strategies. It is actually possible to get
the following generalized version of Fan [18]. We first recall that a mapping ρ on A×B
is said to be concave-like if for every a, a′ ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1], there exists a∗ ∈ A such
that ρ(a∗, ·) ≥ αρ(a, ·) + (1− α)ρ(a′, ·). Convexity-like is defined similarly.
Theorem 2.4 Let A be a compact set, B any set and ρ a concave-like convex-like map-
ping on A×B bounded from below and such that g(·, b) is upper-semicontinuous for every
b ∈ B. Then the zero-sum game on A and B has a value.
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Proof: Let B′ be any finite subset of B and consider an externally consistent strategy
of the first player; its existence is ensures by the following Corollary 4.4. It also implies
that, for every ε > 0, there exists a sequence δn ≥ 0 going to zero such that, at stage n,
inf
b∈B
max
a∈A
ρ(a, b) ≤ max
a∈A
ρ(a, b∗n) ≤ max
a∈A
1
n
n∑
m=1
ρ(a, bm) ≤ ρn + ε+ δn ,
where b∗n is given by the definition of convexity-like applied to
∑n
m=1 bm/n. On Nature’s
side, we can assume that her strategy is such that, at stage n, bn is an action realizing
infb∈B′ ρ(an, b) up to 1/2n. As a consequence,
ρn ≤
1
n
n∑
m=1
min
b∈B
ρ(am, b) +
1
2m
≤ min
b∈B
1
n
n∑
m=1
ρ(am, b) +
1
n
≤ min
b∈B′
ρ(a∗n, b) +
1
n
where a∗n is given by the definition of concavity-like. As a consequence, taking n and ε
to their limits yields that, for any finite subset B′,
inf
b∈B
max
a∈A
ρ(a, b) ≤ sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B′
ρ(a, b).
Since A is compact and ρ(·, b) is upper-semicontinuous, for every ε and B′ the set
Aε[B′] =
{
a ∈ A s.t ρ(a, b) ≥ inf
b∈B
max
a∈A
ρ(a, b)− ε,∀b ∈ B′
}
is a compact non-empty set, and this remains true for any finite intersection over different
subsets. As a consequence, the whole intersection (over every ε and B′) remains compact
and non-empty, and any point a in it must satisfy that ρ(a, b) ≥ infb∈Bmaxa∈A ρ(a, b),
for every b ∈ B. Stated otherwise,
inf
b∈B
max
a∈A
ρ(a, b) ≤ max
a∈A
inf
b∈B
ρ(a, b)
and the game has a value. 
Stronger results can be proved using internally consistent strategies. Aumann [4]
defined correlated equilibria in a game as a distribution on the set of profiles of action
q ∈ ∆ (∏i∈I Ai) such that, for every player i ∈ I and every action a ∈ Ai:
ρi
(
a, q−i[a]
) ≥ max
a∗∈Ai
ρi
(
a∗, q−i[a]
)
, or qi[a]
(
max
a∗∈Ai
ρi
(
a∗, q−i[a]
)− ρi(a, q−i[a])) ≤ 0
where q−i[a] ∈ ∆
(∏
j 6=iAj
)
is the probability induced by q knowing that ai = a and
qi[a] is the probability put on a ∈ Ai by q (or the relative frequency of action a ∈ Ai).
In words, assume that a referee draws a lottery accordingly to q and only tells player i
an action he should play. Then, a correlated equilibrium is a joint distribution such that
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every player, when he is told to play action a (and assuming that the others follows their
recommendation), cannot gain strictly more by playing a∗ instead of a.
It is quite clear (from their very definition) that if every player follows unilaterally
an internally consistent strategy then the empirical distribution of actions converges to
the set of correlated equilibria (but maybe not to one specific correlated equilibrium),
see Foster & Vohra [23].
2.3.2 Regret, (smooth) fictitious play and follow the perturbed leader
Fictitious play is a classic unilateral discrete time dynamic in game theory. At stage n,
each player computes empirical (either joint or product) distributions of actions of his
opponents and plays a best response to it. Although quite natural, this strategy is not
externally consistent. On the contrary, Fudenberg & Levine [28] have introduced a slight
modification, called smooth fictitious play that has asymptotically a regret smaller than
ε (where ǫ > 0 is fixed), see also Hofbauer, Sorin & Viossat [36].
Let ρε denotes an ε-perturbation of ρ (induced by ψ : ∆(A)→ R) defined by
ρε(x, y) = ρ(x, y) + εψ(x), ∀y ∈ ∆(B).
Since we are interested in unilateral procedure, we might as well make a change of variable
by defining U =
(
ρ(a, y)
)
a∈A
∈ [0; 1]A so that ρ(x,U) = 〈x,U〉. As a consequence, the
mapping ρε can be rewritten as
ρε(x,U) = 〈x,U〉+ εψ(x).
We also define the ε-best response mapping by BRε(U) = argmaxx∈∆(cA)〈x,U〉 + ψ(x).
We assume that the mapping ψ : ∆(A)→ R is chosen so that
i) ψ is a continuously differentiable mapping and ‖ψ‖∞ ≤ 1;
ii) The ε-best response mapping BRε is univoque and continuous;
iii) BRε(U) does not belong to the boundary of ∆(A).
Actually, point iii) ensures that ρε attains its maximum at a point where its first deriva-
tive vanishes. It can therefore be weaken into one of the following
iii’) for every U ∈ [0; 1]A, D1ρε(·, U) is equal to zero at x = BRε(U)
iii”) D1ρε(·, U) is orthogonal to the gradient of BRε at U .
Study of σ(hn) = BRε(Un), the strategy associated with this perturbation, might be
simpler in continuous time. First, we introduce the mapping W : [0; 1]A → R defined by
Wε(U) = sup
x∈∆(A)
ρε(x,U) = 〈BRε(U), U〉 + εψ(BRε(U)) .
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In particular, because of point i), regret is asymptotically smaller than 2ε as soon as
lim supn→∞Wε(Un)− ρn ≤ ε. As in Section 1.4.1, the continuous-time dynamic associ-
ated with the discrete-time dynamic of (Un, ρn) is(
U˙, ρ˙
)
∈
{
(V, 〈BRε(U), V 〉 ; V ∈ [0; 1]A
}
−
(
U,ρ
)
.
Define λ(t) = Wε(U(t)) − ρ(t) then one has λ˙ + λ ≤ ε thus λ(t) ≤ ε +Me−t for some
constant M . As a consequence, λ is a Lyapounov function with respect to the set{
(U, ρ) ∈ RA ×R ; Wε(U)− ρ ≤ ε
}
which is thus a global attractor of the dynamic (see Benaïm, Hofbauer & Sorin [7]). So
(Un, ρn) converges almost surely to it and the strategy is ε-externally consistent. Benaïm
& Faure [6] proved recently that external consistency can be achieve (without requiring a
doubling trick argument) with a smooth fictitious play with a vanishing step size; indeed,
they showed that if ε is not fixed but depends on n ∈ N as εn = nγ , with γ < 1, then
asymptotically the regret converges to zero.
Smooth fictitious play (also known as follow the regularized leader) is a generalization
of two classes of algorithms, exponential weight algorithms or its even more general
version called follow the perturbed leader (see Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi [14], Sections 4.2
and 4.3). To recover the first class of algorithms, entropy must be used as regularization,
i.e., ψ(x) = −∑a∈A x[a] log(x[a]) to get
BR1/η(U)[a] =
exp(η Ua)∑
a′∈A exp(η Ua)
which is, by definition, the exponential weight algorithm.
Links with follow the perturbed leader (or Stochastic Fictitious Play accordingly to
Fudenberg & Kreps [26]) might be a bit more tedious. This algorithm does not choose a
deterministic regularization εψ but perturbs each component of Un by a random quantity
εan, such that the joint density f : R
A → R of the vector (εan)a∈A is independent of Un
and n. Action played at stage n+ 1 is any maximizer of U
a
n + ε
a
n. In particular, a given
action a is chosen at this stage with probability Xa(Un) where X
a(·) is defined by
Xa(U) = P
{
argmaxa′∈A U
a′ + εa
′
= a
}
.
Follow the Perturbed Leader generates a discrete stochastic process (Un, ρn) which is an
A.S.D. of the following differential inclusion(
U˙, ρ˙
)
∈
{
(V, 〈X(U), V 〉) ; V ∈ [0; 1]A
}
−
(
U,ρ
)
.
This is a special case of Smooth Fictitious Play since, as soon as f is positive and X
is continuously differentiable, Hofbauer & Sandholm [35] have shown that there exists
a deterministic regularization εψ such that X(U) = BRε(U). For example, in the case
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where εa are i.i.d. with cumulative distribution F (x) = exp
( − exp(−ηx − γ)) (where
γ the Euler constant), follow the perturbed leader coincides exactly with exponential
weight algorithm (see e.g., Lemma 1 in McFadden [54]).
As mentioned before, proofs based on A.S.D. do not exhibit rates of convergences
(and this might be seen a major drawback of these techniques). However, we only
considered here strategies that do not depend on the past sequence of player’s actions
(but only on the sequence of Nature’s choices). So the discrete process is very closed
to the one induced by procedures in law (this is not the case for approachability, see
Section 1.3.1) which is in turn close to the continuous-time process. And it is actually
possible to quantify explicitly these relative differences, see e.g., Sorin [72] or Kwon [40],
in order to recover exact rates of convergence.
3 Calibration
We recall that calibration is a criterion introduced by Dawid [16] in the following repeated
games between a player and Nature. At each stage n ∈ N, Nature chooses a state of the
world ωn in some finite set Ω and the player makes a prediction upon its law by choosing
a probability distribution pn ∈ ∆(Ω). Strategies of the player and Nature are mappings
from the set of finite histories ∪n∈N(Ω ×∆(Ω)n into, respectively, ∆(∆(Ω)) and ∆(Ω).
The usual example consisting of a meteorologist that predicts each day the probability
of rain corresponds to Ω = {0, 1}, with ω = 1 if it rains. This binary case is in fact much
easier than the general case, as discussed in Section 3.1.2.
3.1 Finite (ε and grid) calibration
We will need the following notations. For every p ∈ ∆(Ω) – seen as a subset of RΩ−1 –
and ε > 0, let Nn[p, ε] be the set of stages where the prediction was ǫ-close to p, i.e.,
Nn[p, ε] =
{
m ∈ {1, . . . , n} s.t. ‖pm − p‖ ≤ ε
}
,
where ‖ · ‖ is an Euclidian norm of RΩ−1. We denote by ωn[p, ε] ∈ ∆(Ω) the empirical
distribution of states on Nn[p, ε] and by pn[p, ε] the average prediction on it.
Definition 3.1 A strategy σ of the player is ε-calibrated if for every strategy τ of Nature,
and for every p ∈ ∆(Ω),
lim sup
n→∞
|Nn[p, ε]|
n
(∥∥∥pn[p, ε]− ωn[p, ε]∥∥∥ − ε) ≤ 0, Pσ,τ -as.
A strategy is calibrated if it is ε-calibrated, for every ε > 0.
Intuitively, a strategy is ε-calibrated if on the set of stages (assuming that it is big
enough) where the prediction was ε-close to some p ∈ ∆(Ω), the empirical distribution
of states is close to this specific p. Although not stated explicitly in Definition 3.1, it
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is possible to require that rates of convergence are independent of Nature’s strategy see
Section 4.2 below. With a careful concatenation of ε-calibrated strategies, following the
doubling trick, one can easily obtain a calibrated strategies, as did Foster & Vohra [24]
or Fudenberg & Levine [27]. It remains to construct such strategies, which can be done
using the slightly weaker concept of calibrated strategies with respect to an ε-grid of
∆(Ω) defined below.
We recall that a finite subset
{
x[ℓ] ; ℓ ∈ L} of K ⊂ Rd is an ε-grid of K if for every
x ∈ K, there exists ℓ ∈ L such that ‖x − x[ℓ]‖ ≤ ε. Moreover, such a grid is regular if
there exists {e1, . . . , ed}, d linearly independent vectors, such that{
x[ℓ] ; ℓ ∈ L
}
=
{
d∑
k=1
nkek ; nk ∈ Z
}
∩ K .
Assume that the player can only make predictions on a grid
{
p[ℓ] ; ℓ ∈ L} of ∆(Ω), so
that a strategy is a mapping from the finite histories into ∆(L). Empirical distribution
of states on Nn(ℓ) :=
{
m ∈ {1, . . . , n s.t. pm = p[ℓ]
}
is denoted by qn[ℓ].
Definition 3.2 A strategy σ of the player is calibrated with respect to
{
p[ℓ] ; ℓ ∈ L} if
for every strategy τ of Nature, for every ℓ ∈ L,
lim sup
n→∞
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥−min
k∈L
∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[k]∥∥) ≤ 0, Pσ,τ -as.
In words, a strategy is calibrated with respect to a grid if on the set of stages where p[ℓ]
is predicted, the empirical distributions of states is closer to p[ℓ] than to any other p[k].
Remark 3.1 Given a finite grid, the Voronoï cell associated with p[ℓ] is the set of points
closer to p[ℓ] than to any other p[k], i.e.,
V [ℓ] :=
{
p ∈ ∆(Ω) s.t. ∥∥p− p[ℓ]∥∥ ≤ min
k∈L
∥∥p− p[k]∥∥}.
Each Voronoï is a polytope since they are defined by a finite number of linear inequalities,
their union covers ∆(Ω) and any intersection has empty interior. The fact that the
calibration score
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥−min
k∈L
∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[k]∥∥)
is non positive means that ωn[ℓ] belongs to (or converges to) the Voronoï cell V [ℓ].
Dawid [17] and Oakes [57] proved that there does not exist deterministic ε-calibrated
strategies, based on a counter example given in the following section. On the other
hand, there exists random ε-calibrated strategies, as proved by Foster and Vohra [23] by
exhibiting an algorithm to construct makes the so-called Brier score decrease to zero.
Theorem 3.1 For every grid, there exists a calibrated strategy with respect to it. As
a consequence, for every ε > 0, there exist ε-calibrated strategies, and thus calibrated
strategies.
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To end this section, we note that finite calibration can also be defined with respect
to some weights {ν[ℓ] ∈ R; ℓ ∈ L}. A strategy σ of the player is weighted-calibrated with
respect to
{
p[ℓ], ν[ℓ] ; ℓ ∈ L} if for every strategy τ of Nature, for every ℓ ∈ L,
lim sup
n→∞
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
((∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥2− ν[ℓ])−(min
k∈L
∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[k]∥∥2− ν[k])) ≤ 0, Pσ,τ -as.
Corollary 3.1 For every grid and weights, there exists a calibrated strategy with respect
to them.
Given
{
p[ℓ], ν[ℓ] ; ℓ ∈ L} , the Laguerre cell (or Power cell) associated with p[ℓ] and
ν[ℓ] is
P [ℓ] :=
{
p ∈ ∆(Ω) s.t. ∥∥p− p[ℓ]∥∥2 − ν[ℓ] ≤ min
k∈L
∥∥p− p[k]∥∥2 − ν[k]};
as in Remark 3.1, a weighted-calibrated strategy ensures that ωn[ℓ] converges, as soon
as the frequency of ℓ is not zero, to P [ℓ]. Because of the squared norms, this set is also
a polytope.
3.1.1 Discussion on the impossibility of deterministic calibration
When Ω = {0, 1}, Oakes [57] and Dawid [17] output an example of Nature’s strategy
ensuring that no ε-deterministic calibrated strategies exist. Their idea is actually quite
simple yet highly unstable. Define the strategy as follows: given the past history hn,
if pn+1 ≥ 1
2
then ωn+1 = 0 and if pn+1 <
1
2
then ωn+1 = 1;
In words, if the forecaster claims that it will rain with high probability then Nature does
not make it rain and if it claims that it will not rain, Nature makes it rain.
This prevents any deterministic strategies from being ε-calibrated, but this is not
immediate (and the proof, although quite simple will shed lights on the following dis-
cussion). We distinguish two cases, either the predictions of 1/2 have an asymptotic
positive frequency or a null frequency, i.e., if
either lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣{m ≤ n s.t. pm = 1/2}∣∣∣
n
> 0 or lim
n→∞
∣∣∣{m ≤ n s.t. pm = 1/2}∣∣∣
n
= 0.
In the first case, p[1/2 + ε, ε] ≥ 1/2 while q[1/2 + ε, ε] = 0 thus such a strategy is not
ε-calibrated.
In the second case, we can assume that no prediction falls exactly at 1/2 (since
their frequency goes to zero). If the predictions bigger than 1/2 have an asymptotic
positive frequency, then necessarily, there must exist p∗ such that the set of stages where
predictions belong to [p⋆ − ε, p∗ + ε] ⊂ [1/2; 1] also has a positive frequency. And since
pn[p
∗, ε] ≥ 1/2 and ωn[p∗, ε] = 0, the strategy is not ε-calibrated.
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If the predictions bigger than 1/2 have an asymptotic null frequency, then necessarily
the predictions smaller than 1/2 have an asymptotic positive frequency, and the same
arguments hold (because we assumed that no predictions were equal to exactly 1/2). So
no deterministic strategy can be ε-calibrated.
On the other hand, consider the deterministic strategy of the player that predicts at
odd stages pn = 1/2 and at even stages pn = 1/2 − 1/n. The only accumulation point
of the sequence of predictions if 1/2, so for every p 6= 1/2 there are a finite number of
prediction ε-close to p, for every ε smaller than some εp > 0. And on the other hand,
for p = 1/2, no matter ε, if n is big enough, Nn[0.5, ε] contains approximatively half
predictions below 1/2 and half above, so the empirical distributions is asymptotically
equal to 1/2. As a consequence, no matter ε > 0 and p 6= 0.5,
lim sup
n→∞
|Nn[0.5, ε]|
n
∥∥∥pn[0.5, ε] − ωn[0.5, ε]∥∥∥ = 0 and lim
ε′→0
lim sup
n→∞
|Nn[p, ε′]|
n
= 0.
Obviously, this does not contradict Oakes [57] and Dawid [17] counter-example. The
reason is that, on the stages when the prediction is ε-close to p∗ = 1/2 + ε, the average
prediction is 1/2 while the empirical state is 0. But one might argue that predictions are
actually never close to p∗ (but ε-away), so Oakes and Dawid argument fails if calibration
was defined only with respect only to those points p that are accumulation points of the
sequence of predictions (i.e., there are predictions arbitrarily close to them).
This argument can be generalized to any stationary strategy of Nature (i.e., if
ωn = f(pn) for some fixed but possibly random mapping f). Unfortunately, we are
unable to claim that there exists deterministic (ε-)calibrated strategies with respect to
accumulation points, but this shows how the very concept of calibration is unstable with
respect to small variations in definition or objectives. This subject is somehow once
again developed in Section 3.3.
3.1.2 Efficient calibration in the binary case
Foster [21] has designed an algorithm that computes efficiently an ε-strategy in the
binary case (although it seems that it was Abernethy, Bartlett & Hazan [1] that noticed
its efficiency). The idea is to consider a calibrated strategy with respect to the regular
grid
{
p[ℓ] := ε+ 2ℓε ; ℓ ∈ L} where L := {0, 1, . . . , (⌊ε−1⌋ − 1)/2}
Following Foster’s notation, we define, for every ℓ ∈ L,
eℓn =
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(
ωn[ℓ]− (p[ℓ] + ε)
)
and dℓn =
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(
ωn[ℓ]− (p[ℓ]− ε)
)
so that a strategy is calibrated if, asymptotically, every eℓn and d
ℓ
n are smaller than zero.
Foster’s algorithm consists in finding at stage n an element ℓ∗ ∈ L such that
– either both eℓ
∗
n ≤ 0 and dℓ
∗
n ≤ 0; in that case, predict p[ℓ∗]
– or eℓ
∗−1
n > 0 and d
ℓ∗
n > 0; in that case play p[ℓ
∗] or p[ℓ∗ − 1] with a respective
probability proportional to dℓ
∗
n and e
ℓ∗−1
n .
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Existence of such a ℓ∗ is ensured by the fact that the first d1n and the last eLn are always
non positive. Computations show that the error converges to zero.
So the tricky remaining part consists in finding efficiently this ℓ∗. To this purpose,
Abernethy, Bartlett & Hazan [1] introduced, for every ℓ ∈ L, the quantity
θℓn = e
ℓ
n if e
ℓ
n > 0, θ
ℓ
n = −dℓn if dℓn > 0 and θℓn = 0 otherwise,
which is well defined since eℓn and d
ℓ
n cannot be simultaneously positive. Specifically, it
always holds that θ1n ≥ 0 and θLn ≤ 0 so if any of them is equal to zero, Foster’s strategy
dictates to predict it. Otherwise, one must find ℓ∗ such that θℓ∗−1n > 0 and θℓ
∗
n < 0 and
the main argument is that it can be done through a binary search, thus in O (log(1/ε))
steps.
Foster’s strategy can be somehow generalized with more than two outputs (see e.g.,
Mannor & Stoltz [50]) although, unfortunately, at the cost of efficiency since the binary
search trick does not extend.
3.2 Generalization
Recall that, roughly speaking, a strategy is calibrated if on the set of stages where
the prediction was close to p, the average prediction and the empirical distribution
of outcome asymptotically coincide. General concepts of calibration are induced by a
different definition of closeness.
Let F be a family of Borel measurable subsets of ∆(Ω) and denote, for every F ∈ F ,
Nn[F ] =
{
m ≤ n s.t. pm ∈ F
}
, ωn[F ] =
∑
m∈Nn[F ] ωm
|Nn[F ]| and pn[F ] =
∑
m∈Nn[F ] pm
|Nn[F ]|
respectively the set of stages where the prediction was in F (before the n-th), the em-
pirical distribution of outcomes and the average prediction on it.
Definition 3.3 A strategy σ of the player is F-calibrated if for every strategy τ of Na-
ture,
lim sup
n→∞
sup
F∈F
|Nn[F ]|
n
∥∥∥ωn[F ]− pn[F ]∥∥∥ ≤ 0, Pσ,τ -as .
Several types of families have been considered by various authors. For instance, from
the most to the least complicated
i) Mannor & Stoltz [50] treated the most difficult problem where F is the family of
all Borel measurable subsets of ∆(Ω);
ii) Rakhlin, Sridharan & Tewari [66] considered the family of every possible ℓ1 balls;
ii) Perchet [60] defined F to be some neighborhood basis of ∆(Ω).
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In the first case, the minmax techniques of Rakhlin, Sridharan and Tewari [65, 66]
upper-bound the calibration error at stage n (but with a strategy that depends on n)
in O
(
n−1/(|Ω|+1)
)
while for the two last cases the bound shrinks to O
(
n−1/2
)
. On the
other hand, Mannor & Stoltz [50] and Perchet [60] obtained (actually before) the same
results, yet in a constructive way. They are developed in Section 4.2.
Drawbacks of these definitions of calibration (which will lead to another type of
generalization) are illustrated by the following examples.
Assume that Ω = {0, 1} and that the sequence of outcomes is 0, 1, 0, 1, 0... (i.e., ωn =
1 iff n is even). Consider a player that predicts, at every stage, that the probability of 1 is
exactly 1/2. Then this strategy is calibrated accordingly to any of the previous definitions
of calibration. On the other hand, on the set of even stages, empirical distribution is 1
while average prediction is 1/2 which contradict precepts of calibration.
Even more intricate: assume that Ω = {0, 1, 2} that ωn = 0 with probability 1/3
and that 1 and 2 alternates on the remaining set of stages. The sequence of outcomes
on any fixed subset of N contains asymptotically as many 0 than 1 and 2 so predicting
1/3, 1/3, 1/3 at every stage is not contradicting. On the other hand, if we consider only
the set of stages where the outcome was 1 or 2 then the prediction is always 1/2, 1/2
while 1 and 2 alternate.
We introduce the following concepts of checking rules. Let U and T be respectively
an active universe mapping and a testing mapping, i.e.,
U :
⋃
n∈N
(∆(Ω)× Ω)n ⇉ ∆(Ω)× Ω and T :
⋃
n∈N
(∆(Ω)× Ω)n ⇉ ∆(Ω)× Ω
such that T (hn) ⊂ U(hn). The interpretation is that stage n+1 is active if (pn+1, ωn+1)
belongs to the active universe U(hn); given a set of active stages, calibration compares
the empirical frequency of the tested event with the average prediction of this event.
Such a pair (U ,T ) forms a checking rule and we define as before the set of active
stages
Nn[U ,T ] =
{
m ≤ n s.t. (pm, ωm) ∈ U(hm−1)
}
,
the empirical probability of tested events
ωn[U ,T ] =
∑
m∈Nn[U ,T ] 1{(pm, ωm) ∈ T (hm−1)}
|Nn[U ,T ]| ,
and the average predicted conditional probability of tested events
pn[U ,T ] =
∑
m∈Nn[U ,T ] pm
{
(pm, ωm) ∈ T (hm−1)
∣∣∣U(hm−1)}
|Nn[U ,T ]| .
Definition 3.4 A strategy σ is calibrated with respect to some given checking rule (U ,T )
if, for every strategy τ of Nature,
lim sup
n→∞
|Nn[U ,T ]|
n
∣∣∣ωn[U ,T ]− pn[U ,T ]∣∣∣ ≤ 0, Pσ,τ -as ,
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with the assumption that p{A|B} = +∞ if p{B} = 0.
The following theorem (a weaker version first appeared in Lehrer [41]) continues the
discussion of Section 3.1.1 and weakens furthermore the range of the counterexample of
Oakes and Dawid. It shows that if checking rules do not depend on current predictions
(but possibly on past predictions), then deterministic calibration does exist; this is quite
obvious if one faces only one checking rule, but the result actually holds with an infinite
number of them.
To be formal, we embed the set of checking-rules independent of current prediction
(i.e. pairs of mappings from
⋃
n∈N(∆(Ω)× Ω)n into Ω) with the cylinder topology.
Theorem 3.2 Let λ be a probability distribution on the set of checking-rules independent
of current predictions. Then there exists a deterministic strategy σ that is calibrated with
λ-almost every checking rules.
Actually, the result that we shall prove is stronger as we will show that, as soon as
|Nn[U ,T ]| goes to infinity, lim supn→∞
∣∣∣qn[U ,T ]− pn[U ,T ]∣∣∣ ≤ 0, Pσ,τ -as.
A similar result (that extends Foster & Vohra [24]) due to Sandroni, Smorodinsky
& Vohra [68] deals with checking rules depending on current predictions, under the
following extra assumptions. We assume that the calibration test compares the empirical
distribution of outcomes with the average prediction on the set of active stages where
predictions were in some given set F ⊂ ∆(Ω); activeness of stages might depend on
past histories. Formally, U(hn) is either empty (so the stage n + 1 is not active) or
U(hn) = F × Ω. Mapping T is, on the other side, constant, i.e., T (hn) = F × {ω} for
some ω ∈ Ω (at least on active stages).
Proposition 3.2 Consider a countable number of such checking rules. Then there exists
a strategy of the player that is calibrated with every one of them.
3.3 Smooth calibration
Smooth calibration is another criterion (close to usual calibration) that can be satisfied
with a deterministic strategy, as proved by Foster and Kakade. Even more surprisingly,
it can be used to output a calibrated strategy showing again the instability of Oakes and
Dawid’s result.
The idea is to smooth definitions of calibrations. Indeed, notice that given F ⊂ ∆(Ω),
the calibration score can be written as
|Nn[F ]|
n
∥∥∥ωn[F ]− pn[F ]∥∥∥ = 1n
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
m=1
1{pm ∈ F}(ωm − pm)
∥∥∥∥∥
and the mapping p 7→ 1{p ∈ F} is not continuous. Instead, given some continuous
mapping g : ∆(Ω)→ [0, 1], consider the following smoothen version of the score
1
n
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
m=1
g(pm)(ωm − pm)
∥∥∥∥∥ ;
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with respect to some checking rule (U ,T ) independent of the current predictions (so that
U(hn) and T (hn) can be seen as subset of Ω), this score becomes
1
n
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
m=1
g(pm)1{ωm ∈ U(hm−1)
(
1{ωm ∈ T (hm−1)− pm{T (hm−1)|U(hm−1)}
)∥∥∥∥∥ .
A weaker version of the following Proposition has been proved independently by
Kakade & Foster [37] and Vovk, Nouretdinov, Takemura & Shafer [80]; the former named
this property weak calibration, but we used the term weak in another meaning (i.e., when
horizon of the game is fixed and known).
Proposition 3.3 There exists a deterministic strategy σ of the player such that, no
matter Nature’s strategy, for every continuous mapping g : ∆(Ω)→ R+,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
m=1
g(pm)(ωm − pm)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 0 .
If µ is a probability distribution on the set of checking rules independent of current
predictions, then there exists a deterministic σ such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
g(pm)1{ωm ∈ U(hm−1)
(
1{ωm ∈ T (hm−1)− pm{T (hm−1)|U(hm−1)}
)
≤ 0,
for µ-ae checking rule and every continuous mapping g, no matter Nature’s strategy.
As noticed by Foster and Kakade, the convergence in first part of the result can be made
uniform with respect to Nature’s strategy.
Actually, the most surprising and interesting property of smooth calibration is not so
much that there exist deterministic smooth calibrated algorithms, but that they can be
used to construct an almost deterministic ε-calibrated strategy as follows, see Kakade &
Foster [37] for more details
Let ε be fixed and consider a finite ε-triangulation of ∆(Ω) whose vertices are V :=
{v1, . . . , vV }. Any p ∈ ∆(Ω) belongs to one simplex of the triangulation and we denote
by V (p) its vertices (if there are more than one simplices, then choose one arbitrarily).
The point p can be written as a convex combination of vertices in V (p), i.e. p =∑
v∈V (p) µv(p)v and it is even possible to decompose p =
∑
v∈V µv(p)v by assuming that
µv(p) = 0 for any p that does not belong to the same simplex. All those mappings µv
are continuous and Lipschitz.
We construct an ε-calibrated strategy σ using a fixed deterministic smooth calibrated
strategy σd in the following way. Whenever σd dictates to predict p ∈ ∆(Ω), σ predicts
v ∈ V with probability µv(p). Immediate calculations show that, for every v ∈ V,
Eσ,τ
[
1
n
n∑
m=1
1{pm = v}(ωm − v)
]
=
1
n
n∑
m=1
µv(pm)(ωm − pm) + 1
n
n∑
m=1
µv(pm)(pm − v).
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Since µ(pm)‖pm − v‖ ≤ ε, expected calibration score (and the actual score, thanks to
concentration inequalities) are ε-close to the smooth calibration score, hence the result.
Key features of this construction are that, although it is impossible to construct an
ε-calibrated strategy deterministically (as proved by Oakes and Dawid), it is possible by
using randomizations on arbitrarily small balls. This is why we used the term of almost
deterministic strategies.
Concerning the complexity of (weak) calibration, a recent result of Hazan & Kakade [34],
based on an idea of Kakade & Foster [37], shows that it is a hard criterion to satisfy.
Indeed, an almost deterministic strategy σ (based on some triangulation of ∆(Ω)) can
be used to find ε-Nash equilibria of games. We sketch the proof in the following.
Consider a game between a set of players I with actions sets Ai and payoff mappings
ρi. Define Ω =
∏
i∈I Ai and letXi : ∆(Ω)→ ∆(Ai) be a smooth ε-best response of player
i (i.e., given any p ∈ ∆(Ω), if p−i denotes the i-th marginal of p, then ρi(Xi(p), p−i) ≥
maxx∈∆(Ai) ρi(x, p
−i)− ε).
We denote by pn ∈ ∆(Ω) the prediction output at stage n by the strategy σ and we
assume that player i plays accordingly to Xi(pn). The profile of actions actually played
is ωn ∈ Ω and one has E[ωn] =
(
X1(pn), . . . ,XI(pn)
)
=: X(pn). Since σ is ε-calibrated,
for every vertex v and with probability one,
lim sup
n→∞
∑n
m=1 1{pm = v}
n
∥∥∥∥∑nm=1 1{pm = v}(v − ωm)∑n
m=1 1{pm = v}
∥∥∥∥− ∑nm=1 µv(pm)n ε ≤ 0.
Concentration inequalities, and the fact that X(pn) − ωn and 1{pn = v} − µv(pn) are
martingale differences imply that, with probability one,
lim
n→∞
∑n
m=1 1{pm = v}(X(v) − ωm)
n
= 0 and lim
n→∞
∑n
m=1 1{pm = v} − µv(pm)
n
= 0 .
As a consequence, summing terms, for every vertex v that is predicted with a positive
density (i.e., such that lim supn→∞
∑n
m=1 1{pm = v}/n > 0), one must have ‖v −
X(v)‖ ≤ ε. And so, by the very definition of X(·), v must be a 2ε-Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, not only does the empirical profile of action converge to the convex hull
of ε-Nash equilibria, but also if a stage n chosen at random then, with arbitrarily great
probability, X(vn) is an 2ε-Nash equilibrium.
4 Equivalences between approachability, regret and calibra-
tion
This part is devoted mainly to describe how approachability can be used to construct
consistent and calibrated strategies. We also show why calibration is an important and
useful tool, as it can be used to construct general (and even approachability) consistent
strategies. Since we can also reduce approachability to regret, this complete the circle
and this is the reason why we called these notions equivalent.
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4.1 Using approachability to get regret
4.1.1 From approachability to regret; the finite case
Although Blackwell [10] was the first to notice that consistent strategies can be con-
structed using approachability theory, we first treat Hart & Mas-Colell [32] idea in finite
dimension.
We recall that choices of actions an ∈ A and bn ∈ B generate at stage n ∈ N an
external regret rn defined by
rn = r(an, bn) :=
(
ρ(1, bn)− ρ(an, bn), . . . , ρ(A, bn)− ρ(an, bn)
)
∈ RA
and that a strategy is externally consistent if ‖r+n ‖∞ goes to 0 almost surely. Actually,
using approachability theory, Hart & Mas-Colell [32] proved the following
Proposition 4.1 The strategy σ defined by playing, at stage n+1, proportionally to r+n
(and arbitrarily if every component is non-positive) is externally consistent. Moreover,
for every strategy τ of Nature and n ∈ N,
Eσ,τ
[
‖r+n ‖∞
]
≤ Eσ,τ
[
‖r+n ‖2
]
≤
√
A
n
,
and, for every η > 0, Pσ,τ
{
supN≥n ‖r+n ‖ ≥ η
} ≤ 3 exp(− η2n64A) as soon as η2n32A ≥ 1
Proof: We simply have to prove that σ is exactly Blackwell’s approachability strategy
of the negative orthant RA− (which is a cone) in the game where the vector payoff is
r(a, b). This is a consequence of the following geometric property
No matter the choice of x ∈ ∆(A),
〈
x ,Ex[r(a, b)]
〉
= 0, for all b ∈ B.
Indeed, the k-th component of Ex[r(a, b)] is, by linearity, r(k, b)− r(x, b), thus the inner
product is equal to
∑
a∈A x[a]
(
r(a, b)− r(x, b)) = r(x, b)− r(x, b) = 0.
Since xn+1 = σ(h
n) is proportional to r+n , the geometric property implies that〈
r+n ,Eσ,τ [rn+1]
〉
= 0 thus
〈
rn − r−n ,Eσ,τ [rn+1]− r−n
〉
= 0
because one always has 〈z+, z−〉 = 0. Since r−n is the projection of rn on the negative
orthant, this proves that σ satisfies Blackwell property, hence is an approachability strat-
egy. Bonds follow from Corollary 1.15. 
Once the reduction from external regret minimization to approachability of RA− has
been made, the existence of externally consistent strategies is immediate because RA− is
obviously a convex approachable set. Indeed, for every y ∈ ∆(B), there exists x ∈ ∆(A)
such that r(x, y) ∈ RA−: it suffices to take for x any best response to y. The most
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interesting feature of Proposition 4.1 is that the strategy is very simple and natural: the
more regret a specific action induces, the more it should be played (and with a weight
exactly proportional to this regret generated).
Generalizations to the compact case (when Nature chooses at stage n ∈ N an outcome
vector Un ∈ [0, 1]A) are immediate and omitted.
Remark 4.1 One might argue that with exponential weight algorithm, the dependency
in A in rates of convergence shrinks to
√
log(A) instead of
√
A, so the strategy we output
might not be optimal. Actually this argument is flawed, rates of convergence are indeed
optimal since we minimized the ℓ2-norm of the regret. It is only possible to upperbound
with
√
log(A)/n the ℓ∞-norm of the regret.
Actually, Hart & Mas-Colell strategy is an approachability strategy of RA− driven by the
potential Φ(z) = ‖z+‖2 (that represents the ℓ2-norm of the regret) while exponential
weights are driven by the soft-max potential Φ(z) = 1η log
(∑
a∈A e
ηza
)
which is a twice
differentiable surrogate of ‖z+‖∞. However, minimization of the infinite norm of regret
can also be reduced to approachability, see Proposition 4.2 below (following actually an
idea of Blackwell [10]).
Proposition 4.2 Assume that Nature chooses outcome vectors U ∈ [0, 1]A and define
the game with vector payoffs and target set defined as follows
g(a, U) =
(
Ua, U
)
∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1]A and C =
{
(z, V ) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1]A s.t. z ≥ max
a∈A
V a
}
.
Then any approachability strategy of C (which is a convex approachable set) minimizes
the ℓ∞ norm of the external regret since
dC
(
gn
) ≤ ∥∥r+n ∥∥∞ ≤ √2 dC(gn).
Proof: Convexity of C (which is actually a polytope, i.e., the intersection of a finite
number of half-spaces and a compact set ) is a direct consequence of its definition since
C =
⋂
a∈A
{
(z, V ) s.t z ≥ V a
}⋂
[0, 1] × [0, 1]A .
Approachability of C is immediate: for every U ∈ U , choosing a to be one of the highest
component of U ensures that g(a, U) = (Ua, U) belongs to C. It remains to prove the
inequalities.
Notice that if we denote by (zn, Un) the average vector payoff at stage n, then Un
is the average outcome vector and zn is the average actual payoff. As a consequence,
the ℓ∞ norm of the regret, ‖rn‖∞ = maxa∈A Uan − zn, is exactly equals to the distance
between
(
zn, Un
)
and
(
maxa∈A U
a
n, Un
)
. By definition, the latter belongs to C, therefore
one has dC
(
gn
) ≤ ∥∥r+n ∥∥∞.
Let a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈A Uan and
(
zcn, U
c
n
)
= ΠC
(
zn, Un
)
, then∥∥r+n ∥∥∞ = Ua∗n − zn = Ua∗n − zcn + zcn − zn ≤ ∥∥∥Un − U cn∥∥∥+ ∣∣∣zcn − zn∣∣∣ ≤ √2dC(gn)
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where we used the fact that U 7→ maxa∈A Ua is 1-Lipschitz. 
Extensions to the case where A ⊂ RA is a compact convex set are immediate as the
finiteness of A is not used in the proof.
Actually, Blackwell proved this result in the finite case, where Nature chooses action
in B; in that case, stage payoffs are g′(a, b) = (ρ(a, b), δb) ∈ R ×∆(B) where, as usual,
∆(B) is seen as a subset of RB . The target set is
C′ =
{
(z, y) ∈ R×∆(B) s.t. z ≥ max
a∈A
ρ(a, y)
}
and since ‖g′(a, b)‖ ≤ √2, approachability results imply that g′n converges to C′ at the
rate of
√
2/n thus expected regret is bounded in the order of
√
B/n (because in this
framework, y 7→ ρ(a, y) is √B-Lipschitz and not 1-Lipschitz).
This shows that regret can be bounded, not only with respect to the number of
player’s actions (i.e. in
√
log(A)/n), but also with respect to Nature’s one (in
√
B/n).
This might lead to some improvement if the former is exponentially larger than the
latter.
Remark 4.2 In the compact case, usual proofs show that Blackwell’s approachability
strategy ensures that dC(gn) ≤
√‖g‖∞/n =√(A+ 1)/n. However, there exist a consis-
tent strategy such that ‖r+n ‖∞ ≤ 3
√
log(A)/n. So this is an example where the optimal
dimension dependency of rates of approachability is not
√‖g‖∞, but much smaller.
There are two possible explanations: either minimizing step by step the ℓ2 distance
(i.e. following Blackwell’s strategy) is not optimal, or some important facts are hidden
within proofs. In Remarks 4.1 we claimed that the answer was the first possibility: indeed,
the final objective was to minimize the ℓ∞-distance, so minimizing the ℓ2 norm must
induce an additional dimension-dependent constant. This is not the case here, because
the final objective is within constant of the ℓ2-distance.
An open and fairly question is wether the dimension dependent term should depend
on the specific target set C or not. In these examples, respective sizes of the target sets
C within the set of feasible payoff vectors are rather intriguing. For instance, in the
framework of Proposition 4.1, the volume of co{g(a, b)} is 2A times the volume of C
while it is only A + 1 times the volume of C in the framework of Proposition 4.2. This
has to be compared with the respective size of dimension dependent constants which were√
A and
√
log(A).
We now turn to the minimization of internal regret Rn = R(an, bn). We recall that it
is a A×A-matrix whose (a, a′) component is ρ(a′, b)− ρ(a, b) if a = an and 0 otherwise.
The generalization of Hart & Mas-Colell strategy will appeal to the concept of invariant
measures of matrices.
A probability distribution λ ∈ ∆({1, . . . , d}) is an invariant measure of a some d× d-
matrix M with non-negative coefficient, if
d∑
k=1
λkMk,i = λi
d∑
k=1
M i,k, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d} ,
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and their existence is a consequence of Perron-Frobenius theorem (this also generalizes
usual invariant measure of Markov chains (see e.g. Seneta [69]).
Sorin [71], but also Hart & Mas-Colell [31] and Foster & Vohra [25] used the existence
of invariant measure to output a simple internally consistent strategy.
Proposition 4.3 The strategy σ that dictates to play at stage n + 1 an invariant mea-
sure of R
+
n (and arbitrarily if every component is non-positive) is internally consistent.
Moreover, for every strategy τ of Nature and n ∈ N,
Eσ,τ
[ ∥∥∥R+n ∥∥∥∞ ] ≤ Eσ,τ[ ∥∥∥R+n ∥∥∥2 ] ≤
√
A
n
,
and, for every η > 0, Pσ,τ
{
supN≥n
∥∥∥R+n ∥∥∥ ≥ η} ≤ 3 exp (− η2n64A) as soon as η2n32A ≥ 1.
Proof: As for external regret, we just need to prove that σ is exactly Blackwell’s ap-
proachability strategy of the negative orthant. And again, this is a consequence of a
geometric property:
Any invariant measure λ of any matrix M with non-negative coefficient
satisfies, no matter the choice of b ∈ B,
〈
M ,Eλ[R(a, b)]
〉
= 0.
Let Ua := ρ(a, b), then the (i, k)-component of Eλ[R(a, b)] is λ
i
(
Uk −U i
)
. So the inner
product is equal to
∑
i,kM
i,kλi
(
Uk − U i
)
and the coefficient before U i in this sum is∑
k
λkMk,i − λi
∑
k
M i,k = 0
since λ is an invariant measure of M .
Since xn+1 = σ(h
n) is an invariant measure of R
+
n , geometric properties implies that〈
R
+
n , ,Eσ,τ [Rn+1]
〉
= 0 thus
〈
Rn −R−n ,Eσ,τ [Rn+1]−R−n
〉
= 0 .
This proves that σ satisfies Blackwell property, hence is an approachability strategy and
bonds follows from Corollary 1.15. 
Once again, using approachability theory to prove existence of internally consistent
strategies is immediate: the negative orthant satisfies Blackwell’s property. An inter-
esting feature of this algorithm is the simple characterization of this optimal (for the
minimization of the ℓ2 norm) strategy.
Interestingly, the reduction from external to internal consistent strategies (see Section
2.1.3 or Stoltz & Lugosi [75]) run with the algorithm of Proposition 4.1 constructs exactly
the strategy of Proposition 4.3.
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So both Propositions 4.1 and 4.3 can be unified into the the following theorem that
deals more generally with Φ-regret. It exhibits a strategy with the same complexity as
the previous internally consistent strategy, dictating to play at each stage an invariant
measure of some matrix. Given a family Φ, we recall that Φ-regret at stage n is denoted
by RΦn ∈ R|Φ| and defined by
RΦn = R
Φ(an, bn) :=
(
ρ(φ(an), bn)− ρ(an, bn)
)
φ∈Φ
.
Finally, given M ∈ R|Φ|, let ΘΦ(M) be the A × A-matrix whose (a, a′) component is
ΘΦ(M)a,a
′
=
∑
φ:φ(a)=a′ M
φ
Theorem 4.1 Let Φ be a family of swap mappings. The strategy playing at stage n+ 1
accordingly to any invariant measure of ΘΦ(RΦn
+
) has no Φ-regret. Moreover, for every
strategy τ of Nature and n ∈ N,
Eσ,τ
[ ∥∥∥RΦn+∥∥∥∞ ] ≤ Eσ,τ[ ∥∥∥RΦn+∥∥∥2 ] ≤
√
AΦ
n
,with AΦ = max
a∈A
∣∣∣{φ ∈ Φ s.t. φ(a) 6= a}∣∣∣
and, for every η > 0, Pσ,τ
{
supN≥n
∥∥∥RΦn+∥∥∥ ≥ η} ≤ 3 exp(− η2n64AΦ) as soon as η2n32AΦ ≥ 1.
Proof: The proof follows closely the ones of Propositions 4.1 and 4.3. Indeed, one just
has to prove that this strategy is an approachability strategy of R
|Φ|
− , using the following
geometric property:
Any invariant measure λ of any matrix Θ(M) with non-negative
coefficient satisfies, no matter the choice of b ∈ B,
〈
M ,Eλ[R
Φ(a, b)]
〉
= 0.
Indeed, if one denote U = ρ(·, b), then〈
M,Eλ[R
Φ(a, b)]
〉
=
∑
φ∈Φ
Mφ
∑
a∈A
λa
(
Uφ(a) − Ua
)
=
∑
a∈A
λa
∑
a′∈A
∑
φ:φ(a)=a′
Mφ
(
Ua
′ − Ua
)
=
∑
a∈A
λa
∑
a′∈A
ΘΦ(M)a,a
′
(
Ua
′ − Ua
)
=
∑
a∈A
(∑
a′∈A
λa
′
ΘΦ(M)a
′,a − λa
∑
a′∈A
ΘΦ(M)a,a
′
)
Ua = 0
since λ is an invariant measure of ΘΦ(M). As a consequence, this strategy is exactly
Blackwell’s approachability strategy of the negative orthant. The result comes from
the fact that RΦ(a, b) has at most AΦ non-zero components, each one in [−1, 1], thus
‖RΦ(a, b)‖2 ≤ AΦ. 
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Remark 4.3 As usual, if techniques from approachability in infinite dimension are used
instead of regular approachability, the term in
√
A for external and internal regret or√
AΦ for Φ-regret can be replaced by respectively
√
log(A) or
√
A log(A), up to some
constant.
4.1.2 From approachability to regret; the infinite case
We turn in this section to the case where action set A is no longer finite but some convex
compact metric set and at stage n ∈ N, Nature chooses a mapping Un : A → [0, 1] in
a set U of equicontinuous mapping. We show how previous results can be extended to
this compact case (indeed, Arzela-Ascoli theorem ensures that U is relatively compact).
Theorem 4.2 In this compact case, there exists a strategy without Φc regret, where Φc
is the set of continuous mapping from A to itself.
Proof: Consider an auxiliary game where action sets of player and Nature are A and U .
Choices of a ∈ A and U ∈ U generates a payoff U˜ [a] ∈ L2(Φc, λ), where λ is some fixed
probability distribution over (Φc, ‖ · ‖∞) embedded with the Borelian σ-field, defined by
U˜ [a](φ) := U(φ(a)) − U(a), ∀φ ∈ Φc.
The convex set C = L−2 (Φc, λ) :=
{
U˜ ∈ L2(Φc, λ) s.t. U˜ ≤ 0
}
is not excludable by
Nature; indeed, for any U ∈ U , there exists a ∈ A (any global maximizer of U) such
that U˜ [a] belongs to C. Thus it is approachable by the player, and any approachability
strategy has no φ-regret, for λ-almost all mapping φ ∈ Φc.
However, Φc is separable (see Rudin [67] or Stoltz & Lugosi [76]), so there exists
{φk; k ∈ N} a countable dense subset of Φc; the corresponding probability λ we consider
is λ =
∑
k∈N 2
−kδφk . Since U is a family of equicontinuous mappings, every mapping
U ∈ U share the same modulus of continuity ω(·); this means that, for every ε > 0 there
exists δ := ω(ε) such that if d(a, a′) ≤ δ then |U(a)−U(a′)| ≤ ε, for any mapping U ∈ U .
Given φ ∈ Φc, there exists φk such that ‖φ− φk‖ ≤ δ thus
1
n
n∑
m=1
Um[φ(am)]− Um[am] ≤ 1
n
n∑
m=1
Um[φk(am)]− Um[am] + ε .
Since σ has no φk-regret, its φ-regret is asymptotically smaller than ε, for every ε > 0,
thus it has no Φc-regret. 
Corollary 4.4 Conclusions of Theorem 4.2 hold if U is the convex hull of a finite set
of upper-semicontinuous mappings bounded from below and Φc is the set of constant
mappings.
57
Proof: Every U ∈ U is upper-semicontinuous over a compact set, it admits a maximum.
Therefore U is uniformly bounded and the set C is approachable, with respect to some
probability distribution λ that remains to be defined.
Denote by U1, . . . , Um the extreme points of U . As they are upper-semicontinuous
and bounded, their exists a countable subset {ak; k ∈ N} ⊂ A such that, for every ε > 0
and every a ∈ A, there exists ak satisfying Ui(ak) ≥ Ui(a) − ε, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Define λ as any probability measure whose support is exactly this countable subset.
The rest of the proof follows the one of Theorem 4.2. 
In the finite case, approachability theory not only provides a quick and easy proof of
consistent strategies, but also exhibit explicitly some of them. In fact, playing somehow
proportionally to the positive part of the regret is still externally consistent in the com-
pact case. Let λ be any positive probability measure on {ak; k ∈ N}, a countable dense
subset of A and denote by r+n [ak] the external regret at stage n induces by action ak.
Consider the strategy that chooses ak at stage n + 1 with probability
λkr
+
n [ak ]∑
ℓ λℓr
+
n [aℓ]
.
Then, as in the finite case, one can easily show that the geometric property holds, i.e.,
〈E[rn+1], r+n 〉 =
∑
k
λkr
+
n [ak]∑
ℓ λℓr
+
n [aℓ]
∑
ℓ
(
Un+1(aℓ)− Un+1(ak)
)
r+n [aℓ]λℓ = 0 .
Approachability in infinite dimension (along with the density argument) ensures that
this strategy has no external regret.
Concerning Φ-regret, one cannot simply play accordingly to any invariant measure
of some infinite dimensional matrix, as their existence is not ensured. However, it is still
possible to discretize finitely A to get a Φ-regret smaller than ε, with ε-arbitrary small
(or even equal to 0, if ε is taken as a decreasing sequence, see Proposition 1.7).
Let ωU (·) be the common modulus of continuity of U ∈ U and A a finite ωU(ε)-grid of
A. For any φ ∈ Φ, we define φ : A → A by φ = argmina′∈A d(φ(a),a′) with ties broken
arbitrarily. As a consequence, for every a ∈ A, U ∈ U and non negative q ∈ L2(Φ, λ),∣∣∣∣∫
Φ
q(φ)U(φ(a))dλ −
∫
Φ
q(φ)U(φ(a))dλ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε .
We define, for any (a,a′), Θ[q]a,a′ :=
∫
Φa,a′ qdλ, where Φ
a,a′ :=
{
φ ∈ Φ s.t. φ(a) = a′
}
.
Let x be any invariant measure of the matrix Θ[q] then one has〈
q , U˜(x)
〉
≤
∑
a∈A
xa
∑
a∈A
Θ[q]a,a
′
(
U(a′)− U(a
)
+
∣∣∣∣∫
Φ
q(φ)
(
U(φ(a))− U(φ(a))
)
dλ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
This proves that L−2 (Φc, λ) is a B-set, hence approachable. We can only claim that the
strategy we exhibited has some flavors of invariant measures.
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4.2 Using regret to get calibration
We show in this section that finite calibration can easily be understood in terms of
internal regret. The first idea goes to Foster & Vohra [23] and it has been somehow
clarified by Sorin [71]. Recall that, in finite calibration, Nature chooses at stage n an
outcome ωn ∈ Ω. The player formulates a prediction on ωn by choosing a probability
distribution p[ℓn] ∈ ∆(Ω) that must belong to a finite grid {p[ℓ] ; ℓ ∈ L}.
Theorem 4.3 There exists a strategy σ calibrated with respect to the grid {p[ℓ] ; ℓ ∈ L},
such that, no matter the strategy τ of Nature,
Eσ,τ
[
sup
ℓ∈L
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥2 −min
k∈L
∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[k]∥∥2)] ≤ 6√ log(L)
n
, so
Eσ,τ
[
sup
ℓ∈L
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥−min
k∈L
∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[k]∥∥)] ≤ 6
δ(L)
√
log(L)
n
,
where δ(L) = infℓ 6=k∈L
∥∥p[ℓ]− p[k]∥∥ is the diameter of the grid.
Proof: The proof uses the fact (simply obtained by expanding sums) that, for any
sequence qm and every ℓ, k ∈ L,∑
m∈Nn[ℓ]
‖ωm − p[ℓ]‖2
|Nn[ℓ]| −
‖ωm − p[k]‖2
|Nn[ℓ]| =
∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥2 − ∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[k]∥∥2 .
Now consider the game with action space L and Ω where choices of ℓ and ω generate
the payoff ρ(ℓ, ω) = −‖ω−p[ℓ]‖2. An internally consistent strategy satisfies, by definition,
lim sup
n→∞
sup
ℓ,k
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
( ∑
m∈Nn[ℓ]
∥∥ωm − p[ℓ]∥∥2
|Nn[ℓ]| −
∥∥ωm − p[k]∥∥2
|Nn[ℓ]|
)
≤ 0.
So this, along with the basic fact, shows that any internally consistent strategy is cali-
brated with respect to the grid {p[ℓ]; ℓ ∈ L}. Rates of convergences follows from those
of internal consistency. 
We stress out that we proved a stronger result than require; the calibration score
converges almost surely to zero, at a rate independent of Nature’s strategy.
Remark 4.4 This proof of calibration highlights the following fact. It does not really
matter that ωm belongs to a finite set Ω and that pn are probability distributions over Ω.
Indeed, one can just assume that sequences ωn and pn belong to some compact set of an
Euclidian space Rd. Similarly, given two finite families of predictions {p[ℓ] ∈ Rd; ℓ ∈ L}
and weights {ν[ℓ] ∈ R; ℓ ∈ L}, we recall that weighted calibration sis defined as
sup
ℓ∈L
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
((∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥2 − ν[ℓ])− (min
k∈L
∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[k]∥∥2 − ν[k])),
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and the exact same proof (yet with ρ(ℓ, ω) = −‖ω − p[ℓ]‖2 + ν[ℓ]) gives the existence of
weighted calibrated strategies. Rates of convergence are identical except that the constant
6 is replaced with 6 + 3maxℓ∈L |ν[ℓ]|.
Notice that we defined finite calibration with respect to the uniform norm of the
positive part of
(∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥−mink∈L ∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[k]∥∥)
ℓ,k
. And this quantity is upper-
bounded optimally by the exponential weight algorithm. We could as well have defined
calibration in terms of the ℓ2 norm of this vector and as in regret minimization, playing
an invariant measure could then improve bounds.
Next proposition states that, quite surprisingly, there exist ε-calibrated strategies
with rates of convergence independent of ε (and even of Ω, for a slightly weaker notion).
Proposition 4.5 For every ε > 0, there exists a grid {p[ℓ]; ℓ ∈ L} and a strategy σ such
that, no matter the strategy τ of Nature and for every n ∈ N,
Eσ,τ
[
sup
ℓ∈L
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(∥∥∥pn[ℓ]− ωn[ℓ]∥∥∥− ε)] ≤√ 1n .
Moreover, this strategy is ε-calibrated, with a rate of convergence independent of ε, since
one also has, for every n ∈ N,
Eσ,τ
[
sup
p∈∆(Ω)
|Nn[p, ε]|
n
(∥∥∥pn[p, ε]− ωn[p, ε]∥∥∥ − ε)
]
≤
√
γ(Ω)
n
, with γ(Ω) ≤ (2ΩΩ).
Proof: Let ε be fixed; the strategy considered is simply a calibrated strategy with
respect to some well chosen grid of ∆(Ω). Recall that ∆(Ω) is written as the following
subset of Rd with d = Ω− 1:
∆(Ω) :=
{
q = (q1, . . . , qd) ∈ Rd s.t. q1, . . . , qd ≥ 0 and
d∑
k=1
qk ≤ 1
}
.
Denote by ek the unit vector of R
d whose components are all zero except the k-th which
is one. The regular grid considered is indexed by Lε and defined by{
d∑
k=1
2nk√
d
ε.ek ∈ ∆(Ω);nk ∈ N
}
=:
{
p[ℓ] =
d∑
k=1
2nk[ℓ]√
d
ε.ek ; ℓ ∈ Lε
}
Given a point p[ℓ] of the grid, its neighbors are points p[ℓ′] such that nk[ℓ] = nk[ℓ′] for
every k ∈ {1, . . . , d} except for exactly one k0 which is such that
∣∣nk0 [ℓ] − nk0 [ℓ′]∣∣ = 1.
So if we denote by N [ℓ] ⊂ Lε the neighbors of p[ℓ], it contains at most 2d elements.
The basic idea behind the specific geometry of this grid is that
any point q ∈ ∆(Ω) is closer to p[ℓ] than to any other p[ℓ′] if and only if
it is closer to p[ℓ] than to any of its neighbors.
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Consider the game introduced in the proof of Theorem 4.3, except that choices of ℓn ∈ Lε
and ωn generate an internal regret R
′
n whose (ℓ, ℓ
′)-th component is
(R′n)
ℓ,ℓ′ =
{ ∥∥∥ωn − p[ℓ]∥∥∥2 − ∥∥∥ωn − p[ℓ′]∥∥∥2 if ℓ = ℓn and ℓ′ ∈ N [ℓ]
0 otherwise
.
As a consequence, using the simple fact concerning averages of norms,
‖R′n‖ ≤ 4
ε√
d
and R
′
n =
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥2 − ∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ′]∥∥2)
l∈Lε,k∈N [ℓ]
.
Same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4.3 yield that playing, at stage n+1, any
invariant measure of (R
′
n)
+ ensures that Eσ,τ
[∥∥∥(R′n)+∥∥∥2] ≤ 16ε2/(dn).
It remains to relate
∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥ to ‖R′n‖. First, we write ωn[ℓ] = p[ℓ] +∑dk=1 xkek
where we can assume (up to a change of signe) that every xk is positive and even
xk ≥ ε/
√
d (otherwise ωn[ℓ] is even closer to p[ℓ]).
We denote by p[ℓk] = p[ℓ] + 2εek/
√
d the neighbor of p[ℓ] in the direction of ek, so
that ek = (p[ℓk]− p[ℓ])/‖p[ℓk]− p[ℓ]‖. Triangle inequality implies that
∥∥p[ℓ]− ωn[ℓ]∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥p[ℓ]−
(
p[ℓ] +
d∑
k=1
ε√
d
ek
)∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥
(
p[ℓ] +
d∑
k=1
ε√
d
ek
)
− ωn[ℓ]
∥∥∥∥∥
= ε+
∥∥∥∥∥p[ℓ] +
d∑
k=1
p[ℓk]− p[ℓ]
2
− ωn[ℓ]
∥∥∥∥∥
= ε+
√√√√ d∑
k=1
〈
p[ℓ] +
d∑
k=1
p[ℓk]− p[ℓ]
2
− ωn[ℓ], ek
〉2
= ε+
√√√√ d∑
k=1
〈
p[ℓk] + p[ℓ]
2
− ωn[ℓ], p[ℓk]− p[ℓ]‖p[ℓk]− p[ℓ]‖
〉2
= ε+
√√√√√ d∑
k=1
(∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥2 − ∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓk]∥∥2)2
4
∥∥p[ℓk]− p[ℓ]∥∥2
= ε+
√
d
4ε
√√√√ d∑
k=1
(∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥2 − ∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓk]∥∥2)2.
To sum up, we have prove that, for every ℓ ∈ Lε,
∥∥p[ℓ]− ωn[ℓ]∥∥− ε ≤ √d
4ε
√√√√ ∑
k∈N [ℓ]
[(∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓ]∥∥2 − ∥∥ωn[ℓ]− p[ℓk]∥∥2)+]2 .
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Multiplying both sides of this inequality by |Nn[ℓ]|n , taking the square and summing over
ℓ ∈ Lε, one obtains∥∥∥R˜n∥∥∥2
2
:=
∑
ℓ∈Lε
[ |Nn[ℓ]|
n
(∥∥p[ℓ]− ωn[ℓ]∥∥− ε)]2 ≤ d
16ε2
∥∥∥∥(R′n)+∥∥∥∥2
2
,
therefore the strategy σ ensures that
Eσ,τ
[
sup
ℓ∈Lε
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(∥∥p[ℓ]− ωn[ℓ]∥∥− ε)] ≤ Eσ,τ [∥∥∥R˜n∥∥∥
2
]
≤
√
1
n
.
This gives the first part of the proof. The last part is due to the fact that there are less
than (2
√
d)d points in the ε-ball centered at some p ∈ ∆(Ω). 
Proposition 4.5 also allows to recover the following result of Mannor & Stoltz [50]
Theorem 4.4 When F is the family of all Borel subsets of ∆(Ω), there exists a F-
calibrated strategy σ such that, for every strategy τ of Nature,
Eσ,τ
[ |Nn[F ]|
n
∥∥∥∥pn[F ]− ωn[F ]∥∥∥∥] ≤ 7n− 1Ω+1 , Pσ,τ -a.s.,
and, for every δ > 0, with probability at least 1− δ, one also has
|Nn[F ]|
n
∥∥∥∥pn[F ]− ωn[F ]∥∥∥∥ ≤ 9
n
1
Ω+1
+ 2
√
log
(
2
δ
)
n
, Pσ,τ -a.s..
Proof: The result is a consequence of a doubling trick applied to strategies constructed
in Proposition 4.5. Assume that the strategy adapted to some ε is played during N
stages. On those stages, one has
|Nn[F ]|
n
∥∥∥∥pn[F ]− ωn[F ]∥∥∥∥ − ε ≤ ∑
ℓ∈Lεk
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(∥∥∥∥p[ℓ]− ωn[ℓ]∥∥∥∥ − ε) ≤√Lε ∥∥∥R˜n∥∥∥2 .
Taking expectation and using the fact that Lε ≤ ε−d yield that
Eσ,τ
[ |Nn[F ]|
n
∥∥∥∥pn[F ]− ωn[F ]∥∥∥∥] ≤ ε+
√
1
εd
√
1
n
Hence, the doubling trick adapted to the sequences εk =
(
d
2k
) 1
d+2 , played during 2k stages
ensures that, denoting n = 2k0 +m < 2k0+1,
Eσ,τ
[ |Nn[F ]|
n
∥∥∥∥pn[F ]− ωn[F ]∥∥∥∥] ≤ 1n
(
k0−1∑
k=0
2k2εk +mεk0 +
√
1
εdk0
m
)
≤ 2 1
2k0
k0∑
k=0
2k
d+1
d+2 ≤ 4
2
d+1
d+2 − 1
1
2
k0+1
d+2
≤ 7 1
n
1
d+2
.
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High probability bounds are classics consequences of concentration inequalities, since
|Nn[F ]|
∥∥∥ωn[F ] − pn[F ]∥∥∥/n = ∥∥∥Y n∥∥∥ where the sequence Yn = (ωn − pn)1{pn ∈ F} is
such that ‖Yn‖2 ≤ 2 and, by Jensen inequality, ‖Y n‖ ≤ ‖Y n − E[Y n]‖+ E[‖Y n‖]. 
In fact, Theorem 4.4 slightly improves the result of Mannor & Stoltz [50] since it
implies that
lim sup
n→∞
n
1
Ω+1
|Nn[F ]|
n
∥∥∥∥ωn[F ]− pn[F ]∥∥∥∥ ≤ 7, Pσ,τ -as.
Rakhlin, Sridharan & Tewari [66] wrote the calibration problem in terms of a gen-
eralized regret, see Section 2.2.2. Formally, assume that actions spaces are respectively
∆(Ω) and Ω and that the stage game payoff is null, i.e. g(p, ω) = 0. The class of depar-
ture function considered are
{
ξp,λ; p ∈ ∆(Ω), λ > 0
}
where ξp,λ : ∆(Ω)× Ω → RΩ and
the evaluation mappings Bn :
(
R
Ω
)n → R are defined by, for every n ∈ N,
ξp,λ[g](pn, ωn) = 1{‖pn − p‖1 ≤ λ}(pn − δωn) and Bn(Z1, . . . , Zn) =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
m=1
Zm
∥∥∥∥∥ .
As a consequence, one easily has that regret is upper bounded by calibration score, as
sup
p,λ
Bn
(
ξp,λ[g](p1, ω1), . . . , ξp,λ[g](pn, ωn)
)
−Bn
(
g(p1, ω1), . . . , g(pn, ωn)
)
=sup
p,λ
Nn[p, λ]
n
∥∥∥∥ωn[p, λ]− pn[p, λ]∥∥∥∥ .
The max-min formulation of the regret minimization problem (see Section 2.2.2) proves
that supp,λ
∥∥∥∥ωN [p, λ] − pN [p, λ]∥∥∥∥NN [p, λ]/N is upper bounded at the final stage N by
cΩ2
√
log(N)/N where c is a universal constant. An alternative (and actually more
general) proof is given in the next section.
4.3 Using Approachability to get (smooth and generalized) Calibra-
tion
In this section, we show that recent results in calibration can be rewritten solely as the
existence or construction of some approachability strategy. The first result we exhibit is
a generalization of both a previous one of Perchet [60] (since the strategy is calibrated
with respect to much larger families) and Rakhlin, Sridharan & Tewari [66] (because the
proof is constructive and not horizon dependent).
Theorem 4.5 Let F :=
{
B[p, λ]∞; p ∈ ∆(Ω), λ > 0
}
be the family of ℓ∞-balls. Then
there exists a calibrated strategy σ such that, no matter the strategy τ of Nature and for
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every n ∈ N,
Eσ,τ
[
sup
p∈∆(Ω),λ>0
|Nn[p, λ]|
n
∥∥∥∥ωn[p, λ]− pn[p, λ]∥∥∥∥
∞
]
≤ 12
√
2
Ω
n
log
(
2n
Ω
)
.
Proof: Let ε > 0 be fixed. As in the proof of Proposition 4.5, the set ∆(Ω) is represented
as a subset of Rd (with d = Ω− 1),
∆(Ω) =
{
p = (p1, . . . , pd) ∈ Rd s.t. p1, . . . , pd ≥ 0 and
d∑
k=1
pk = 1
}
and we consider the regular ε-grid Lε defined by{
d∑
k=1
2nkε.ek ∈ ∆(Ω);nk ∈ N
}
=:
{
p[ℓ] =
d∑
k=1
2nk[ℓ]ε.ek ; ℓ ∈ Lε
}
.
Although the family of ℓ∞-balls is infinite, the number of different possible intersections
of such a ball with the grid Lε is obviously finite (it is trivially bounded by its number
of subsets, 2Lε). However, an ℓ∞-ball B∞(p, λ) is rectangular and can be described by
two extreme points: the lowest corner p −∑dk=1 λek and the highest corner (in every
direction) p+
∑d
k=1 λek
The grid Lε is regular, so this characterization holds for intersections with ℓ∞ balls:
they are characterized by two extreme points. As a consequence, they are at most
Lε ≤ ε−2d different possible intersections. Consider a fixed family of ℓ∞-balls that
induce exactly these different intersections, and denote it
{
B∞(p[k], λk); k ∈ K
}
.
We introduce an auxiliary game with action space Lε and Ω, payoff mapping
g(ℓ, ω) =
(
1
{‖p[ℓ]− p[k]‖ ≤ λk}(p[ℓ]− δω))
k∈K
and consider the closed and convex target set C := B∞(0, ε) ⊂
(
R
d
)K
.
Given q ∈ ∆(Ω), the pure action ℓ corresponding to a point of the grid p[ℓ] such
that ‖p[ℓ] − q‖∞ ≤ ε ensures that g(ℓ, q) belongs to C which is therefore approachable.
Moreover, since C is rectangular, the approachability strategy of Corollary 1.16, adapted
to the potential Φ(z) = 1η log
(∑
k∈K
∑d
i=1 e
η(zki −ε) + e−η(zki −ε)
)
, ensures that
Eσ,τ
[
‖gn‖∞
]
≤ ε+ 4η + log(2dK)
ηn
≤ ε+ 4η + log(2d) + 2d log(1/ε)
ηn
.
Therefore, given N ∈ N such that N ≥ 2ed, the choice of ε/4 = η =
√
d
8N log
(
N
2d
)
ensures in particular that
Eσ,τ
[
‖gN‖∞
]
≤ 6
√
d
N
log
(
N
2d
)
.
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As usual, when playing by blocks of increasing size 2m (starting atm such that 2m ≥ ed),
the last two displays ensure that, for every n ∈ N,
Eσ,τ
[
‖gn‖∞
]
≤ 12
√
2
d
n
log
(
2n
d
)
.
The result comes from the fact that, by construction, for every n ∈ N,
sup
p∈∆(Ω),λ>0
|Nn[p, λ]|
n
∥∥∥∥ωn[p, λ]− pn[p, λ]∥∥∥∥
∞
= ‖gn‖∞.

If d ≥ 3, since Lε ≤ ε2d/d!, constants in Theorem 4.5 can be lowered if one is
only interested in the asymptotic behavior. This result holds almost surely since, using
concentration inequalities, with Pσ,τ probability at least 1− δ,
∥∥gn∥∥∞ ≤ 12
√
2
d
n
log
(
2n
d
)
+ 2
√
2d
n
log
(
2n
d
)
+
1
n
log
(
1
δ
)
.
Statement concern ℓ∞ balls; however, it is also possible to show that for other ℓp-balls,
the number of possible intersection with the grid is bounded by O
(
1
ε
)O(Ω2)
(see e.g.
Rakhlin, Sridharan & Tewari [66]). Thus the results holds, up to some polynomial term
in Ω, for any other ℓp-norm.
This technique could actually have been used to proved Theorem 4.4, a similar result
with respect to the family of Borel sets. The difference is that the number of possible
intersection between Borel sets and our grid would have been in the order of 21/ε
d
. After
taking the logarithm, equalizing the three remaining terms in regret ε, η and 1/(εdηn)
yields that ε = η = n−1/(d+2). This would have been the bound on expected regret.
We now turn to calibration with checking rules and smooth calibration, and we show
that they can be reduced to approachability problems. We recall that given a pair of
mappings U and T , we defined
Nn[U ,T ] =
{
m ≤ n s.t. (pm, ωm) ∈ U(hm−1)
}
,
the empirical probability of tested events
ωn[U ,T ] =
∑
m∈Nn[U ,T ] 1{(pm, ωm) ∈ T (hm−1)}
|Nn[U ,T ]| ,
and the average predicted conditional probability of tested events
pn[U ,T ] =
∑
m∈Nn[U ,T ] pm
{
(pm, ωm) ∈ T (hm−1)
∣∣∣U(hm−1)}
|Nn[U ,T ]| .
If a checking rule is independent of current predictions, then the same definition hold
with (pm, ωm) ∈ U(hn) (resp. in T (hn)) replaced by ωm ∈ U(hn) (resp. in T (hn)).
65
Theorem 4.6 Let λ be a probability distribution on the set of checking-rules independent
of current predictions. Then there exists a deterministic strategy σ that is calibrated with
λ-almost every checking rules such that, Pσ,τ -almost surely,
lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣ωn[U ,T ]− pn[U ,T ]∣∣∣ ≤ 0,
as soon as |Nn[U ,T ]| increases to infinity.
Proof: Proof relies essentially on approachability with activation in infinite dimension.
We define an auxiliary game where payoff is a random variable over the set of checking
rules independent of current predictions. Action set of the player is reduced to ∆(Ω)0,
the interior of ∆(Ω) – so that conditional probabilities are well defined – and payoff at
stage n is 1{ωn ∈ T (hn−1)} − p{T (hn−1)|U(hn−1)} if the coordinates (U ,T ) is active,
i.e., if n ∈ Nn[U ,T ].
By definition, average payoff at stage n is exactly ωn[U ,T ] − pn[U ,T ] and we shall
construct a strategy σ that approaches the convex set {0}, that is, using Theorem 1.6,
find pn+1 ∈ ∆(Ω)0 such that, for every ω ∈ Ω,
∫ (
ωn[U ,T ]− pn[U ,T ]
)
.
(
1{ω ∈ U(hn)}
(
1{ω ∈ T (hn)} − pn+1 {T (hn)|U(hn)}
)
|Nn+1[U ,T ]| dλ
is less or equal to zero (or at least smaller than εn = 1/n
2).
To construct this pn+1, we consider the game with payoff defined on ∆(Ω)0 and Ω by
g(p, ω) =
∫
ωn[U ,T ]− pn[U ,T ]
1 + |Nn[U ,T ]| 1{ω ∈ U(h
n)}
(
1{ω ∈ T (hn)} − p {T (hn)|U(hn)}
)
dλ
and g is extended linearly in its second variable on ∆(Ω). Since one always has
1{ω ∈ U(hn)}ωn[U ,T ]− pn[U ,T ]
1 + |Nn[U ,T ]| = 1{ω ∈ U(h
n)}ωn[U ,T ]− pn[U ,T ]|Nn+1[U ,T ]|
the integrals in the last two displayed equations coincide, so we just need to prove that
there exists pn+1 ∈ ∆(Ω)0 such that g(pn+1, ω) ≤ εn, for every ω ∈ Ω or, more generally,
that
inf
p∈∆(Ω)0
sup
ω∈Ω
g(p, ω) ≤ 0.
And this is a consequence of Lemma 5.1, since g(p, p) = 0 for every p ∈ ∆(Ω)0, g(p, ·) is
affine and g(·, p) is continuous on ∆(Ω)0. 
When checking rules might depend on current predictions (see Sandroni, Smorodinsky
& Vohra [68] or Foster, Rakhlin, Sridharan & Tewari [22]), the result and proof are almost
identical.
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Proposition 4.6 Let λ be a probability distribution on the set of checking-rules. Then
there exists a strategy σ that is calibrated with λ-almost every checking rules such that,
Pσ,τ -almost surely,
lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣ωn[U ,T ]− pn[U ,T ]∣∣∣ ≤ 0,
as soon as |Nn[U ,T ]| increases to infinity.
Proof: the proof is almost identical to the case of checking rule independent of predictions.
The only difference lies in the definition of the payoff g(p, ω) which is∫
ωn[U ,T ]− pn[U ,T ]
1 + |Nn[U ,T ]| 1{(ω, p) ∈ U(h
n)}
(
1{(ω, p) ∈ T (hn)} − p {T (hn)|U(hn)}
)
dλ.
Since g(·, ω) might not be continuous, Lemma 5.1 does not apply. However, g is bounded
and defined over ∆(Ω)0 and Ω, the former being measurable and the latter finite. There-
fore, see Sorin [70] Theorem A.9, this game has a value in mixed action. And this value
has to be smaller than 0 since g(p, p) = 0 for every p ∈ ∆(Ω)0. 
The last similar reduction to approachability concerns smooth calibration.
Theorem 4.7 There exists a deterministic strategy σ of the player such that, no matter
Nature’s strategy, for every continuous mapping g : ∆(Ω)→ R+,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
m=1
g(pm)(ωm − pm)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 0 .
The same result holds if one adds checking rules independent of current predictions.
Proof: The set of continuous mappings from ∆(Ω) to R+ is separable and we denote
by λ a probability distribution with support {gk; k ∈ N}, a dense countable family.
Following the lines of the proof of Therorem 4.6, we define
ωn[gk] =
∑n
m=1 gk(pm)ωm
n
and pn[gk] =
∑n
m=1 gk(pm)pm
n
.
Then, Corollary 1.4 ensures the existence of an approachability strategy such that, for
every k ∈ N, ∥∥ωn[gk] − pn[gk]∥∥ converges to zero. Indeed, one just has to prove that
{0} ⊂ L2 is approachable, thus that for every n ∈ N, there exists pn+1 ∈ ∆(Ω) such
that, no matter ω ∈ Ω,∫ (
ωn[gk]− pn[gk]
)(
gk[pn+1](ω − pn+1)
)
dλ ≤ 0,
where we assumed that 0/0 = 0. The existence of such p ∈ ∆(Ω) is again a consequence
of Ky Fan’s inequality generalized in Lemma 5.4.
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Since {gk; k ∈ N} is a dense family, necessarily
∥∥ωn[g] − pn[g]∥∥ must converges to
zero, for every continuous mapping g. 
A close look to the first proof of existence of deterministic smooth calibrated strate-
gies, due to Kakade & Foster [37], shows that they also have constructed an ε-approachability
strategy (and then used a doubling trick). We proposed here a direct (and maybe more
intuitive) proof.
4.4 Using calibration to get regret and approachability
Calibration in some auxiliary game can be seen as a useful tool to construct strategies
that satisfies another criterion as approachability, no internal regret and so on. This
idea goes back to Foster & Vohra [23] and was used, recently, by Perchet [59, 61, 62];
in particular, it is useful in a specific case of general regret (see Section 2.2.2) defined
below.
But first, we focus on usual internal regret in the finite case (although it can be
generalized immediately when B is any compact set). Recall that a strategy is internally
consistent if the supremum limit of
|Nn[a]|
n
(
max
a∗∈A
ρ
(
a∗, bn[a]
) − ρ(a, bn[a]))
is non positive. By linearity of ρ(a, ·), this quantity can be immediately rewritten into
|Nn[a]|
n
((∥∥ρ(a, ·)− bn[a]∥∥2 − ‖ρ(a, ·)‖2)− min
a∗∈A
(∥∥ρ(a∗, ·) − bn[a]∥∥2 − ‖ρ(a∗, ·)‖2)) ,
up to a factor 2. As a consequence, any weighted-calibrated strategy with respect to
{ρ(a, ·), ‖ρ(a, ·)‖2 ; a ∈ A} is internally consistent. Since scores are actually exactly the
same, rates of convergence of weighted calibration give rates for regret minimization.
We now turn to generalized regret. Assume that A and B are two compact and
convex sets and let G : A× B → R be any fixed evaluation mapping that might not be
linear in any of its coordinates. In this framework, a strategy has no G-external regret if
lim sup
n→∞
sup
a∗∈A
G(a∗, bn)−G(an, bn) ≤ 0.
To define internal regret, assume that a strategy only uses a finite number of actions in
AL = {a[ℓ]; ℓ ∈ L}, so that σ is actually a mapping from the set of finite histories into
L, and ℓn = ℓ means that action a[ℓ] is played at stage n. Define
Nn[ℓ] = {m ≤ n s.t. ℓm = ℓ}, and bn[ℓ] = 1|Nn[ℓ]|
∑
m∈Nn[ℓ]
bm.
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A strategy has no (L, ε)-internal regret if, no matter the strategy τ of Nature, Pσ,τ -almost
surely,
lim sup
n→∞
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(
sup
a∗∈A
G
(
a∗, bn[ℓ]
)−G(a[ℓ], bn[ℓ])− ε) ≤ 0, ∀ℓ ∈ L.
Proposition 4.7 If G is continuous, then for every ε > 0 there exists a (L, ε)-internally
consistent strategy. However, their might not exist any (ε-)externally consistent strate-
gies.
Proof: Since G is continuous, for every ε > 0, there exists some δ such that ‖(a, b) −
(a′, b′)‖ ≤ δ implies that |G(a, b) −G(a′, b′)| ≤ ε/2. Consider σ′ any calibrated strategy
with respect to
{
b[ℓ]; ℓ ∈ L
}
, a δ/2 grid of B. Assume that when σ′ predicts b[ℓ], then
σ dictates to play a[ℓ] ∈ argmaxa∈AG(a, b[ℓ]).
Since σ′ is calibrated, for every η > 0, one has that, Pσ′,τ -as after some stage N ,
sup
ℓ∈L
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(∥∥∥b[ℓ]− bn[ℓ]∥∥∥2 − δ2
4
)
≤ η.
In particular, as soon as η ≤ δ2/4, either η n|NN [ℓ]| is smaller than δ2/4 and then ‖b[ℓ] −
bn[ℓ]
∥∥∥2 ≤ δ2, or |NN [ℓ]|n is smaller than 4η/δ2.
The first case implies that G(a, b[ℓ])−G(a, bn[ℓ]) ≤ ε/2 for every a ∈ A, thus in both
cases one has that, after stage N ,
sup
ℓ∈L
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(
sup
a∗∈A
G(a∗, b[ℓ])−G(a[ℓ], bn[ℓ])− ε
)
≤ 8‖G‖∞
δ2
η,
which characterizes a (L, ε)-calibrated strategy.
It remains to prove that there might not exist externally consistent strategies. Define
G(a, b) = (1− 4b)a, for every a ∈ [0, 1] and b ∈ [0, 1] and assume that during the first N
stages (with N is large enough) bn = 0. Necessarily aN is arbitrarily close to 1. During
the next N stage, define bn = 1 then a2N is at most 1/2 thus the external regret is of at
least 1/2. 
We now prove how to construct an ε-approachability strategy via calibration. Given
a closed and compact set C ⊂ Rd and a vector payoff mapping g : ∆(A)×∆(B) → Rd,
define G(x, y) = −dC(g(x, y)) for every x ∈ ∆(A) and y ∈ ∆(B). If C is approachable,
then Blackwell’s condition ensures that supx∗∈∆(A)G(x∗, y) = 0 for every y ∈ ∆(B). By
convexity of dC and the triangle inequality,
dC(gn) ≤
∑
ℓ∈L
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
dC(gn[ℓ])
≤ ε+
∑
ℓ∈L
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
(
dC
(
g(a[ℓ], bn[ℓ])
) − ε)+∑
ℓ∈L
|Nn[ℓ]|
n
∥∥∥∥g(x[ℓ], bn[ℓ])− gn[ℓ]∥∥∥∥.
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Both sums converges almost surely to zero, respectively because σ has no internal re-
gret (with respect to G) and because of concentration inequalities since g(x[ℓ], bn) =
E[g(an, bn)]. One can resort to the doubling trick (since we can easily derive uniform
speed of convergence) to get an approachability strategy.
4.5 Using regret to get approachability
We proved in the last section how calibration and generalized regret can be used to
construct approachability strategy, as noticed by Perchet [59] or Rakhlin, Sridharan &
Tewari [66]. A completely different link can also be formulated between regret and
approachability, as discovered recently by Abernathy, Bartlett & Hazan [1]. We recall
that Blackwell’s strategy consists in playing, at stage n + 1, optimally in the zero-sum
projected game 〈g(x, y)−πC(gn), gn−πC(gn)〉. Abernathy, Bartlett & Hazan [1] proposed
to use a regret minimization scheme to determine, stage by stage, in which projected
game to play (i.e., not necessarily along the direction gn − πC(gn)).
The formulation is rather simple when C = {0} ⊂ Rd, so we will focus only on this
case. It can however be generalized to any convex cone and therefore to any convex set
in Rd (seen as a section of a convex cone in Rd+1). The basic idea is to notice that, for
C = {0} and every n ∈ N,
dC(gn) = ‖gn‖ = sup
θ∈B(0,1)
〈θ, gn〉, where B(0, 1) =
{
θ ∈ Rd, ‖θ‖2 ≤ 1
}
.
Assume that at stage m, the player played optimality in the projected game along the
direction θm−1. Since C is approachable, this zero-sum game has a negative value, hence
〈θm−1,E[gm]〉 ≤ 0. As a consequence,
E
[
dC(gn)
]
= E
[
‖gn‖
]
≤ E
[
sup
θ∈B(0,1)
〈θ, gn〉 −
1
n
n∑
m=1
〈θm−1, gm〉
]
.
The term inside the expectation can be written as the external regret if player and Na-
ture’s action set are respectively B(0, 1) and
{
g(a, b); (a, b) ∈ A×B
}
. As a consequence,
an approachability strategy can indeed be described as a two step procedure. At any
stage n, choose, in a first step, a direction θn ∈ B(0, 1) following any regret minimization
algorithm. Then, in a second step, play optimally in the projected zero-sum game on θn.
Blackwell’s strategy dictates to choose (in the first step) the direction θn that maxi-
mizes 〈θ, gn〉 ; in other words, this is precisely the follow the leader algorithm that does
not guarantee a shrinking regret (in full generality). The key point to understand this
feature is that, by definition of the second step, 〈θm,E[gm+1]〉 is always non-positive
(no-matter the choice of θm) ; so, in this auxiliary game, Nature is in fact very restricted
on her choice of actions and what is even more intricate, these restrictions depend on
the player’s move.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Game Theory lemma
The following Lemma generalizes Ky Fan’s inequality [19] recalled below:
Let K be a convex compact set of some Euclidian space and g : K×K → R such that,
for every y ∈ K, g(·, y) is concave over K and for every x ∈ K, g(x, ·) is continuous over
K. If g(x, x) = 0 for every x ∈ K, then there exists x0 ∈ K such that supx∈K g(x, x0) ≤ 0.
Lemma 5.1 Let g be a mapping on some compact and convex set X ⊂ Rd such that
g(x, x) = 0 for every x ∈ X0 the interior of X (such a mapping is called anti-symmetric).
If for every x ∈ X , g(·, x) is concave and g(x, ·) is continuous and uniformly bounded
by some M > 0 on X0, then
inf
x∈X0
sup
x′∈X
g(x′, x) ≤ 0.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that 0 belongs to X0 and we denote, for
every ε > 0 small enough, the convex compact set Xε :=
{
(1 − ε)x;x ∈ X}. Then
g and Xε satisfy assumptions of Ky Fan’s inequality. Thus, there exists xε such that
g(x, xε) ≤ 0 for every x ∈ Xε.
Given x ∈ X , we denote by x− the point on the boundary of X on the opposite
direction of x, i.e., such that x−‖x−‖ = − x‖x‖ . We also define ‖X−‖ = infx∈X ‖x‖.
Since g(·, xε) is concave, for every x in X that is not in Xε, one has
g
(
x, xε
)− g((1− ε)x, xε)
ε‖x‖ ≤
g
(
(1− ε)x, xε
)− g(x−, xε)
(1− ε)‖x‖ + ‖x−‖ ,
therefore, since (1− ε)x ∈ Xε and g(·, xε) ≤ 0 on Xε, one has
g
(
x, xε
) ≤ − ε‖x‖
(1− ε)‖x‖ + ‖x−‖g(x−, xε) ≤ ε
M‖X‖
(2 − ε)‖X−‖ .
Hence the result, since the right hand term goes to 0 as ε decreases to 0. 
5.1.1 Uniform concentration inequalities
The following lemmas are central in different proofs. We recall that a process Zt ∈ Rd
is a martingale difference sequence if E
[
Zt+1
∣∣Z1, . . . , Zt] = 0. Moreover, if ‖Zt‖2 ≤ K
then Hoeffding-Azuma’s inequality in Euclidian spaces (see Corollary 3.5 in Kallenberg
& Sztencel [38]) yields that, for every integer T ≥ 1,
P
{∥∥ZT∥∥ ≥ ε} ≤
(
1 +
√
T
K2
ε
)
exp
(
−1
2
T
K2
ε2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−1
4
T
K2
ε2
)
, (14)
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or, P
{∥∥ZT∥∥ ≥ φ−1(δ)/√T} ≤ δ with φ(x) := (1 + x/K) exp (−x2/2K2). Actually, a
weak maximal version of this inequality holds:
P
{
∃ t ≤ T , ∥∥Zt∥∥ ≥ T
t
ε
}
≤ φ
(√
Tε
)
or P
{
∃ t ≤ T , ∥∥Zt∥∥ ≥ √T
t
φ−1(δ)
}
≤ δ.
For d = 1, one can define φ(x) = 2 exp
(−x2/2) and φ(x) = 2 exp (−x2/4) otherwise.
Stronger maximal inequalities for averages of martingale differences exist:
Lemma 5.2 Let Zt be a martingale difference sequence with ‖Zt‖ ≤ K then, for every
δ > 0 and every integer T ≥ 1,
P
{
∃ t ≤ T, ∥∥Zt∥∥ ≥ 2√
t
φ−1
(
δ
4
t
T
)}
≤ δ.
Proof: Define εt = 2φ
−1 (δt/4T ) /
√
t. Using a peeling argument, one obtains
P
{∃ t ≤ T, ‖Zt‖ ≥ εt} ≤ ⌊log2(T )⌋∑
m=1
P
{ 2m+1−1⋃
t=2m
{‖Zt‖ ≥ εt}
}
≤
⌊log2(T )⌋∑
m=1
P
{ 2m+1⋃
t=2m
{‖Zt‖ ≥ ε2m+1}
}
≤
⌊log2(T )⌋∑
m=1
P
{ 2m+1⋃
t=2m
{t‖Zt‖ ≥ 2mε2m+1}
}
≤
⌊log2(T )⌋∑
m=1
P
{ 2m+1⋃
t=2m
{t‖Zt‖ ≥
√
2m+1φ−1
(
δ
4
2m+1
T
)
}
}
≤
⌊log(T )⌋∑
m=1
2m+1
T
δ
4
≤ 2
log2(T )+2
T
δ
4
≤ δ.
Hence the result. 
Similarly, maximal inequalities can be derived for tail events:
Lemma 5.3 Let Zt ∈ Rd be a martingale difference sequence with ‖Zt‖ ≤ K then, for
every ε > 0 and every integer T ≥ 1,
P
{
∃ t ≥ T, ∥∥Zt∥∥ ≥ ε} ≤ 4 exp(− Tε2
8K2
)
.
The exponential dependency in T can be reduced since one has, as soon as Tε
2
2K2 ≥ 1,
P
{
∃ t ≥ T + 1, ∥∥Zt∥∥ ≥ ε} ≤ 2K2
ε2
1 +√ Tε2
2K2
+
1√
Tε2
2K2
 exp(− Tε2
2K2
)
.
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Proof: Again, using a peeling argument, one obtains
P
{∃ t ≥ T, ‖Zt‖ ≥ ε} ≤ +∞∑
m=0
P
{ 2m+1T−1⋃
t=2mT
{‖Zt‖ ≥ ε}
}
≤
+∞∑
m=0
P
{ 2m+1T⋃
t=2mT
{t‖Z t‖ ≥ 2mTε}
}
≤
+∞∑
m=0
φ
(√
2m+1T
ε
2
)
≤
∫ ∞
0
φ
(√
2xT
ε
2
)
dx
=
1
log(2)
∫ ∞
Tε2
8K2
φ(K
√
2v)
v
dv =
1
log(2)
∫ ∞
Tε2
8K2
(1 +
√
2v)
v
e−vdv
hence
P
{
∃ t ≥ T, ∥∥Zt∥∥ ≥ ε} ≤ 1
log(2)
 1
Tε2
8K2
+
√
2√
Tε2
8K2
 exp(− Tε2
8K2
)
and the first part of the result follows.
The second part of the proof follows from the facts that
P
{∃ t ≥ T + 1, ‖Zt‖ ≥ ε} ≤ +∞∑
t=T+1
P
{
‖Zt‖ ≥ ε
}
≤
+∞∑
t=T+1
(
1 +
√
t
K2
ε
)
exp
(
−1
2
t
K2
ε2
)
≤
∫ ∞
T
(
1 +
√
xε2
K2
)
exp
(
− xε
2
2K2
)
dx
≤ 2K
2
ε2
∫ ∞
√
Tε2
K2
(u+ u2) exp(−u2/2)du,
and ∫ ∞
x
(u+ u2)e−
u2
2 du = (1 + x)e−
x2
2 +
∫ ∞
x
e−
u2
2 du ≤
(
1 + x+
1
x
)
e−
x2
2 .

5.2 Probability lemmas
Lemma 5.4 Let fn ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F) such that
∑
n∈N ‖fn‖2/n <∞ and ‖fn+1 − fn‖ ≤ 1n ,
then fn converges to 0, µ-as.
Proof: First, we prove a weaker version when ‖fn‖ < 1/
√
n for every n ∈ N.
73
Let Mn = ⌈n6/5⌉ and kn be the integer minimizing ‖fk‖ over [Mn +1,Mn+1]. Then,
‖fkn‖2 ≤
∑Mn+1
k=Mn+1
‖fk‖2
Mn+1 −Mn ≤
Mn+1
Mn+1 −Mn
Mn+1∑
k=Mn+1
‖fk‖2
k
≤
Mn+1∑
k=Mn+1
2n
‖fk‖2
k
≤ 2
Mn+1∑
k=Mn+1
‖fk‖2
k1/6
≤ 2
Mn+1∑
k=Mn+1
1
k6/5
.
Therefore,
∑
n∈N ‖fkn‖ <∞ and Fatou’s lemma ensures that fkn converges to 0, µ-as.
Let us define hk = fk − fkn , then for evert k > kn (and similarly for k < kn)
‖hk‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
k∑
j=kn+1
(fj − fj−1)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ k − knMn ≤ Mn+1 −MnMn .
Summing over k, one gets
∑
k∈N
‖hk‖2 ≤
∑
n∈N
(Mn+1 −Mn)
(
Mn+1 −Mn
Mn
)2
<∞ since Mn+1 −Mn
Mn
≤ O
(
1
n
)
.
So both hk and fkn converge µ-as to 0 and thus, so is fk = hk + fkn .
In the general case, one just need to notice that there exists an increasing sequence
βn > 1 such that
∑
n∈N βn‖fn‖2/n < ∞ and to define Mn+1 =
⌈
βMn
βMn−1
⌉
Mn + 1. The
proof follows as before, since Mn+1−Mn ∼ MnβMn−1 and thus Mn+1/(Mn+1−Mn) ∼ βMn

Lemma 5.5 Let C be a product set in L2(Ω, µ,F) and assume that for every n ∈ N
i) gn ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F) is bounded by B ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F)
ii) X n ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F) takes value in {0, 1}
iii) gX ,n =
∑n
k=1Xm gm/Sn where Sn =
∑n
m=1 Xm
iv)
〈
X n+1(gX ,n −ΠC(gX ,n),
gn+1 −ΠC(gX ,n)
Sn+1
〉
≤ εn, for a sequence of non-negative
εn such that
∑
n∈N εn <∞.
Then gX ,n converges to C, µ∞-as, where µ∞(A) = µ (A ∩ {limSn =∞}).
Proof: Let fn = gn −ΠC(gn) then point iv) implies that:
‖fn+1‖2 ≤ ‖fn‖2 − 2
〈
Xn+1 fnX n+1
, fn
〉
+
∥∥∥∥Xn+1Sn+1 (gn+1 − gn)
∥∥∥∥2 + εn.
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Since both gX ,n+1 and gX ,n are bounded by B and Xn ∈ {0, 1}, one has:
2
〈
Xn+1 fnSn+1 , fn
〉
≤ ‖fn‖2 − ‖fn+1‖2 + 4
∫
Ω
Xn+1(ω)
S2n+1(ω)
B2(ω)dµ(ω) + ε.
Notice that, for every ω,
∑
n∈NXn+1(ω)/S2n+1(ω) ≤
∑
n≥1 1/n
2 = π2/6. For every
n ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, let j(n, ω) := inf {m ∈ N,Sm(ω) = n} be the first time such that
Sm(ω) is bigger than n (if it exists, otherwise it is ∞). Define f˜n(ω) := fj(n,ω)(ω), with
f∞(ω) = 0, so that
∑
n∈N
∥∥∥f˜n∥∥∥2
n+ 1
=
∑
n∈N
〈
Xn+1 fnSn+1 , fn
〉
≤ ‖f0‖
2
2
+
π2
3
‖B‖2 +
∑
n∈N
εn.
Since C is a product set, projection on C is a coordinate-wise projection, thus∣∣∣f˜n+1(ω)− f˜n(ω)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣[gjn+1,ω(ω)− gjn,ω(ω)]− [ΠC (gjn+1,ω) (ω)−ΠC (gjn,ω) (ω)]∣∣∣
≤ 2
∣∣∣gjn+1,ω(ω)− gjn,ω(ω)∣∣∣ = 2 ∣∣∣∣gjn+1,ω(ω)− gjn,ω(ω)n+ 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4B(ω)n+ 1
and so ‖f˜n+1 − f˜n‖2 = 16‖B‖2/(n + 1)2.
Using Lemma 5.4, with βn an increasing sequence such that
∑
βn‖f˜‖2/n converges
and Mn+1 =
⌈
βMn
βMn+1
⌉
, we obtain the µ-a.s. convergence of f˜n. As a consequence, after
restriction to the event {limSn =∞}, fn converges µ-as to zero. 
Being a product set is used to bound
∥∥∥f˜n+1 − f˜n∥∥∥; convexity of C (nor actually its
L2-boundedness, as defined by Lehrer [42]) is not enough for this proof. The reason
is that if we define the mapping g˜n ∈ L2(Ω, µ,F) by g˜n(ω) = gj(n,ω)(ω) and let N :=
j(n, ω). Then, without the product property which induces a coordinate-wise projection,
ΠC (g˜n) (ω) has no reason to be equal to ΠC (gN ) (ω).
Corollary 5.6 Same results hold if Xn ∈ [0, 1] does not necessarily take values in {0, 1}.
Proof: Assume that g0 = 0 and X 0 = S0 = 1, then
∑∞
n=0 X 2n /S2n is uniformly bounded.
Indeed, define kn = min{m s.t. Sm ≥ n}, so that
∞∑
n=0
χ2n
S2n
− 1 =
∞∑
n=1
kn+1−1∑
m=kn
χ2n
S2n
≤
∞∑
n=1
1
n2
kn+1−1∑
m=kn
χ2n ≤
∞∑
n=1
1
n2
kn+1−1∑
m=kn
χn ≤
∞∑
n=1
1
n2
.
Therefore, on {limSn → ∞}, g˜χ,n =
∑n
m=0 Xm gm/Sm converges to C, and g˜χ,n − gX ,n
converges to zero.

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